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INTRODUCTION 
Alberto Mora served as General Counsel of the Department of the 
Navy from 2001 to 2005. Mora was concerned about the 
government’s treatment of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay. He had 
led an internal Defense Department effort to ensure that the 
government would begin to treat those prisoners humanely. But he 
had met powerful opposition—including Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld and Defense Department General Counsel 
William Haynes—who wanted the government to have a free hand 
to treat the Guantanamo Bay prisoners more harshly during 
interrogations. Mora fought an internal, bureaucratic battle on this 
issue, marshalling allies from within the uniformed services, but he 
never revealed to anyone outside the government this internal 
struggle over prisoner treatment. Eventually, after the Abu Ghraib 
scandal, he wrote a lengthy memorandum to the Navy Inspector 
General describing how he and Judge Advocate General lawyers 
argued for humane treatment, and how Haynes and other Defense 
Department officials responded.1  
 Mora left the Defense Department in December of 2005 and was 
approached by a journalist, Jane Mayer of the New Yorker, who 
had obtained a copy of his memorandum. Mayer wanted to speak 
with Mora to better understand the policy battle that had taken 
place within the Defense Department. Mora agreed to speak with 
her, and Mayer wrote about the internal Defense Department battle 
and profiled Mora in the New Yorker.2  
 
 
 1. See Memorandum from Alberto J. Mora, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of the Navy, to Navy Inspector 
Gen. (July 7, 2004), http://aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/mora_memo_july_2004.pdf. See also Jane Mayer, 
The Memo: How an Internal Effort to Ban the Abuse and Torture of Detainees was Thwarted, NEW 
YORKER, Feb. 27, 2006, at 32.  
 2. See Carnegie Council, Dan Rather Interviews Alberto J. Mora, Former U.S. Navy General 
Counsel (Nov. 2, 2006), http://www.cceia.org/resources/transcripts/5404.html; Mayer, supra note 1. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss5/2
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 When asked why he agreed to speak with a journalist about this 
issue after remaining publicly silent for so long, Mora noted that his 
memorandum to the Inspector General was unclassified, and thus 
the government had deemed that release of the information could 
not cause damage to national security. Someone had provided 
Mayer with a copy of the memorandum, and so Mora thought that 
he could legitimately amplify and give her additional background 
on the memorandum. When asked whether his duty of 
confidentiality as a lawyer prevented him from revealing further 
information, Mora responded that because Mayer already had some 
information, it seemed that the duty of confidentiality had been 
waived.3  
A lawyer’s duty of confidentiality is not subject to the kind of waiver 
that Alberto Mora posited. A client’s revelation of some information about 
a topic does not give her lawyer the option of revealing additional 
information about that same topic.4 In most states, a lawyer’s duty of 
confidentiality is defined very broadly and applies to all information 
relating to the representation of the client. The lawyer is required to be 
discreet with such information whether or not it could harm or embarrass a 
client, and whether or not the client has revealed the information to others. 
In most states, the professional confidentiality rule does not distinguish 
between government and private sector lawyers.5 Thus, government 
lawyers appear to be bound by the same broad confidentiality obligation as 
lawyers for private sector clients.6 
 
 
 3. Alberto Mora, Remarks at Ethics of Lawyering in Government course, Washington 
University Congressional & Administrative Law Clinic, Washington, D.C. (Apr. 3, 2006).  
 4. See discussion of confidentiality exceptions infra notes 27–32 and accompanying text. 
Attorney-client privilege, by contrast, is subject to client waiver. If a client reveals information about a 
conversation with a lawyer, then the client has waived the privilege for that conversation and can be 
forced to reveal more information about that otherwise privileged conversation. RESTATEMENT THIRD 
OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 79 (2000) (“The attorney-client privilege is waived if the client 
. . . voluntarily discloses the communication in a non-privileged communication.”). 
 5. The exception is Hawaii, which has adopted different confidentiality standards for 
government lawyers. See HAWAII RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c)(4)–(5) (2007) (discussed infra 
Part III.A). 
 6. This Article uses the term “government lawyers” to refer to lawyers who are either employed 
or retained by the government. Most government-retained lawyers generally have traditional lawyer-
client relationships with their government clients, while some lawyers employed by governments have 
the authority to make decisions that are usually in the hands of the client. This difference in the 
structure of authority can have implications for the lawyer’s confidentiality duty. See infra Part II.C. 
For a discussion of how several legal ethics rules (but not the duty of confidentiality) apply to lawyers 
retained by governments, see Ronald D. Rotunda, Ethical Problems in Federal Agency Hiring of 
Private Attorneys, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 85 (1987). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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This broad confidentiality obligation would seem to prohibit a former 
government lawyer like Mora from giving any information about his work. 
Although there are exceptions to this duty of confidentiality (the 
professional confidentiality rule identifies eight in particular7), it is not 
clear that any of these exceptions would permit Mora’s disclosure.8  
Was Mora permitted to discuss these internal Defense Department 
debates about prisoner treatment? This Article is an attempt to answer that 
question for Mora and for the more than 100,000 federal, state, and local 
government lawyers who need to determine which information they can 
ethically reveal.9  
Surprisingly little has been written on the question of government-
lawyer confidentiality.10 A spate of law review articles and student notes 
 
 
 7. ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct (hereinafter “Model Rule”) 1.6(a) identifies two 
exceptions. The lawyer may disclose information if: 
• “the client gives informed consent” to the disclosure; or 
• the lawyer is impliedly authorized to make the disclosure “in order to carry out the 
representation.” 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2007). The remaining exceptions are found in Model 
Rule 1.6(b)(1)–(6). See infra notes 27–32 and accompanying text. 
 8. It appears that Mora’s conduct would be governed by the D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct 
because he is licensed to practice by the District of Columbia. D.C. Bar, Find a Member, 
http://www.dcbar.org/find_a_member/index.cfm (last visited Mar. 21, 2008) (indicating that Alberto 
Mora was admitted to practice in D.C. in 1994).  
 The information that Mora disclosed would constitute “secret” information “the disclosure of 
which would be embarrassing . . . to the client.” D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2006). 
Mora might be able to justify his disclosure by arguing that his client consented to disclosures related 
to government wrongdoing. See id. 1.6(d)(1) (“A lawyer may . . . reveal client . . . secrets . . . with the 
consent of the client affected, but only after full disclosure to the client.”). See also infra Part III.A.1 
(arguing that the whistleblower protection laws constitute government consent to lawyer disclosure of 
wrongdoing). 
 9. The Bureau of Labor Statistics indicates that the federal government employs 28,440 
lawyers, state governments employ 34,760 lawyers, and local governments employ 49,110 lawyers, for 
a total of 112,310 lawyers employed by the government. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T 
OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES MAY 2006, http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/ 
oes231011.htm#nat.  
 10. Robert P. Lawry wrote one of the most comprehensive examinations of this issue before the 
American Bar Association adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which is now the model 
for lawyer regulation in forty-seven states and the District of Columbia. Robert P. Lawry, Confidences 
and the Government Lawyer, 57 N.C. L. REV. 625 (1979) [hereinafter Lawry, Confidences]; see also 
Robert P. Lawry, Who is the Client of the Federal Government Lawyer? An Analysis of the Wrong 
Question, 37 FED. B.J. 61 (Fall 1978) [hereinafter Lawry, Wrong Question]; http://www.abanet.org/ 
cpr/mrpc/model_rules.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2008) (indicating that California, New York and Maine 
are the only states that have not adopted professional conduct rules that follow the format of the ABA 
Model Rules). Several articles have briefly examined confidentiality in the course of a broader look at 
the ethical issues facing government lawyers. See Steven K. Berenson, The Duty Defined: Specific 
Obligations That Follow from Civil Government Lawyers’ General Duty to Serve the Public Interest, 
42 BRANDEIS L.J. 13, 31–45 (2003); Catherine J. Lanctot, The Duty of Zealous Advocacy and the 
Ethics of the Federal Government Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 951 
(1991); Geoffrey P. Miller, Government Lawyers’ Ethics in a System of Checks and Balances, 54 U. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss5/2
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about the government’s attorney-client privilege were published after the 
high-profile legal battle on this issue between Independent Counsel 
Kenneth Starr and President Bill Clinton.11 But outside the context of 
Freedom of Information requests, the issue of attorney-client privilege 
arises relatively rarely for government lawyers. On the other hand, 
government lawyers face the confidentiality issue every day when they 
decide which information they can share with friends and colleagues both 
inside and outside of government.  
This Article makes several significant contributions to the literature on 
government lawyers. First, it provides a theoretical basis for identifying 
the client of a government lawyer. There is no single answer to the 
question of client identity for government lawyers. Instead, one must 
 
 
CHI. L. REV. 1293 (1987); Richard C. Solomon, Wearing Many Hats: Confidentiality and Conflicts of 
Interest Issues for the California Public Lawyer, 25 SW. U. L. REV. 265 (1996). 
 Several articles have examined the ability of government lawyers to blow the whistle on 
government misconduct. See Roger C. Cramton, The Lawyer as Whistleblower: Confidentiality and 
the Government Lawyer, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 291 (1991); Charles S. Doskow, The Government 
Attorney and the Right to Blow the Whistle: The Cindy Ossias Case and Its Aftermath (A Two-Year 
Journey To Nowhere), 25 WHITTIER L. REV. 21 (2003); James E. Moliterno, The Federal Government 
Lawyer’s Duty to Breach Confidentiality, 14 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 633 (2005); Jesselyn 
Radack, The Government Attorney-Whistleblower and the Rule of Confidentiality: Compatible at Last, 
17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 125 (2003). Others have looked specifically at the confidentiality obligations 
of prosecutors. See Rita M. Glavin, Note, Prosecutors Who Disclose Prosecutorial Information for 
Literary or Media Purposes: What About the Duty of Confidentiality?, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1809 
(1995); Rachel Luna, Note, The Ethics of Kiss-and-Tell Prosecution: Prosecutors and Post-Trial 
Publications, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 165 (1998). 
 11. That legal battle occurred in separate court cases in the D.C. and Eighth Circuits. See In re 
Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1998); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910 (8th 
Cir. 1997). Articles about these cases include Lance Cole, The Government-Client Privilege After 
Office of the President v. Office of the Independent Counsel, 22 J. LEGAL PROF. 15 (1998); Todd A. 
Ellinwood, “In the Light of Reason and Experience”: The Case for a Strong Government Attorney-
Client Privilege, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 1291 (2001); Melanie B. Leslie, Government Officials as 
Attorneys and Clients: Why Privilege the Privileged?, 77 IND. L.J. 469 (2002); Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, Who “Owns” the Government’s Attorney-Client Privilege?, 83 MINN. L. REV. 473 (1998); 
Marion J. Radson & Elizabeth A. Waratuke, The Attorney-Client and Work Product Privileges of 
Government Entities, 30 STETSON L. REV. 799 (2001); Patricia E. Salkin & Allyson Phillips, 
Eliminating Political Maneuvering: A Light in the Tunnel for the Government Attorney-Client 
Privilege, 39 IND. L. REV. 561 (2006); Adam M. Chud, Note, In Defense of the Government Attorney-
Client Privilege, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1682 (1999); Amanda J. Dickmann, Note, In re Lindsey: A 
Needless Void in the Government Attorney-Client Privilege, 33 IND. L. REV. 291 (1999); Bryan S. 
Gowdy, Note, Should the Federal Government Have an Attorney-Client Privilege?, 51 FLA. L. REV. 
695 (1999); Katherine L. Kendall, Note, In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum: Destruction of the 
Attorney-Client Privilege in the Governmental Realm?, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 421 (1998); Note, 
Maintaining Confidence in Confidentiality: The Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege to 
Government Counsel, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1995 (1999). For earlier treatments of the issue, see Lory A. 
Barsdate, Note, Attorney-Client Privilege for the Government Entity, 97 YALE L.J. 1725 (1988); 
Ronald I. Keller, Note, The Applicability and Scope of the Attorney-Client Privilege in the Executive 
Branch of the Federal Government, 62 B.U. L. REV. 1003 (1982). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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examine the structure of authority within government to identify which of 
several possible entities is actually the client.  
Second, the Article explains how government and private sector 
lawyers’ confidentiality duties differ even though the ethics rules do not 
differentiate between them. Government lawyers’ confidentiality duties 
are not based solely on the broad mandate of confidentiality found in the 
legal ethics rules, but also on the complex regime for control of 
government information. While lawyers are normally bound by a broad 
duty of confidentiality (applying to all “information relating to 
representation”) under the legal ethics rules, a client can consent to 
disclosure of otherwise confidential information.12 One of the insights of 
this Article is that government clients have consented to large amounts of 
disclosure by their lawyers through enactment of open government laws.  
In other words, to determine whether the client of a government lawyer 
has consented to a specific disclosure, the lawyer need not rely solely on a 
particular government official’s ad hoc decision about whether to consent. 
Instead, that official is bound to respect the legal regime controlling 
government information. If that legal regime requires that information be 
disclosed, then the institutional client has consented to its disclosure. If 
that legal regime prohibits the information from being disclosed, then the 
institutional client has withheld consent to disclosure.  
The third significant contribution of this Article is that it identifies for 
the first time the need to revise the confidentiality rule to clarify that 
government lawyers have the discretion to disclose government 
wrongdoing. Examination of case law and statutes suggests a norm that 
governments—unlike private sector clients—do not have a legitimate 
interest in keeping secret information about their own wrongdoing. Other 
scholars have not previously recognized that the implication of this norm 
is that government lawyers may be able to disclose government 
wrongdoing. 
Part I of this Article outlines the lawyer’s confidentiality obligation, 
which is both strict and broad. One of the exceptions to that obligation, 
however, is that clients can consent to disclosure. Thus, Part II examines 
in some depth the identity of the government lawyer’s client, and 
concludes that no single definition of a client applies to all government 
lawyers. Instead, one must examine the structure of authority within the 
particular government context where the lawyer works. Only with such a 
contextualized and structural analysis can one properly identify the 
 
 
 12. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2007). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss5/2
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government lawyer’s client and the extent of the lawyer’s authority to 
make decisions on behalf of that client. In addition, Part II notes that 
certain government lawyers are authorized to make decisions that are 
normally in the hands of clients.  
Part III explains the specific ways in which government lawyers’ 
confidentiality obligations differ from those of private sector lawyers. 
First, policy concerns and specific whistleblowing protection laws suggest 
that government lawyers may disclose government wrongdoing. Second, 
as a substantive matter, government lawyers must be permitted to disclose 
information that is subject to mandatory disclosure under open 
government laws. Since this could result in a chaotic situation with each 
government lawyer applying her own conception of open government 
laws, this Article recommends that governments adopt a set of procedures 
that lawyers can use to get approval of such disclosures. To that end, Part 
III sets out the substantive standard for the government lawyer’s 
confidentiality obligation. Part IV recommends the adoption of specific 
procedures so that government lawyers can make these disclosures in an 
orderly fashion, providing their clients with advance notice and protecting 
legitimate government interests. 
I. SECRECY AND TRANSPARENCY IN LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONS AND IN 
GOVERNMENT 
In the early 1970s, Mark Felt, a law school graduate and licensed 
lawyer, was the Associate Director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI). On several occasions, Felt had provided 
information to Bob Woodward, an acquaintance of his who was a 
reporter for the Washington Post. When Woodward was assigned to 
cover the Watergate break-in in June 1972 he asked for Felt’s 
assistance, and Felt provided it. As the number two official at the 
FBI, Felt had “full responsibility for the day-to-day Watergate 
investigation.”13 Felt surreptitiously provided Woodward with leads 
and confirmed information that Woodward learned from other 
sources.14 In the book chronicling the Watergate investigation, 
Woodward referred to Felt as “Deep Throat” and credited this 
 
 
 13. MARK FELT & JOHN O’CONNOR, A G-MAN’S LIFE: THE FBI, BEING “DEEP THROAT,” AND 
THE STRUGGLE FOR HONOR IN WASHINGTON 193 (2006). 
 14. Id. at 215 (“Only two days after the [Watergate] burglary, [Felt] helped Woodward on the 
Washington Post’s first big story, confirming that [Howard] Hunt was connected to the White House 
and a prime suspect in the break-in.”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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source with a critical role in the Post’s investigation.15 While there 
was much speculation about the identity of this anonymous source, 
Woodward indicated he would not reveal Deep Throat’s identity 
until after the source died. But in 2005, Felt came out as Deep 
Throat in a Vanity Fair profile written by a Felt family friend, and 
Felt later published a revised memoir acknowledging his role in the 
Watergate investigation.16 Felt’s memoir asserts that he was 
motivated by a desire to protect the FBI from interference by the 
White House.17 Frustrated that the White House had prevented the 
FBI from fully investigating the ties between the Watergate burglars 
and the Nixon White House, Felt used Woodward to instigate public 
and congressional pressure for a more thorough investigation.18 
 When Felt leaked information about the FBI’s investigation to 
Bob Woodward, he was apparently trying to protect the FBI’s 
institutional interest in its independence from the White House.19 
Yet by providing information to Woodward, he violated the FBI’s 
own rules for protection of confidential information. If Felt had 
been acting as a lawyer rather than as an administrator, would this 
leak have violated his professional duty of confidentiality?20 If 
Felt’s role as Deep Throat had been revealed while his law license 
was current, could he have been disciplined for revealing this 
information to Woodward, or was he legally justified in making 
these disclosures?21 
 
 
  15. CARL BERNSTEIN & BOB WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT’S MEN 71 (1974). 
 16. John D. O’Connor, “I’m the Guy They Called Deep Throat,” VANITY FAIR, July 2005, at 86; 
see also FELT & O’CONNOR, supra note 13. In 1979, Felt published his original memoir, which was, of 
course, silent about his role as “Deep Throat.” W. MARK FELT, THE FBI PYRAMID FROM THE INSIDE 
(1979). 
 17. FELT & O’CONNOR, supra note 13, at xiii.  
 18. Id. at 216–21. 
 19. Id. at xiii (asserting that Felt “stood alone to guard the FBI’s integrity” and that “when the 
Nixon administration tried to subvert the Bureau as it had other government agencies, Mark met with 
Woodward to shed light on the abundant misuses of power”). 
 20. Felt was in a government job that routinely required legal judgments about compliance with 
constitutional and statutory standards as well as court rules, but it appears that he was not acting as a 
lawyer. Lawyers advise and advocate on behalf of clients. Felt was an administrator who was advised 
by lawyers.  
 21. Felt actually did face bar discipline for other actions he took at the FBI. He had authorized 
warrantless searches of the homes and apartments of people associated with the Weather Underground. 
W. MARK FELT, THE FBI PYRAMID FROM THE INSIDE 327 (1979). After his retirement, Felt 
acknowledged his role in these warrantless searches, id. at 330, and was eventually convicted for 
criminal violation of the constitutional rights of those subjected to these illegal searches. Robert Pear, 
2 Ex-F.B.I. Officials Are Found Guilty in Break-ins Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1980, at A1. After his 
felony conviction, the District of Columbia Bar suspended Felt’s bar license. In re W. Mark Felt, No. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss5/2
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To understand the legal status of any government lawyer’s disclosure, 
one must consider two distinct legal regimes: that which applies to all 
lawyers and that which applies to all government employees. This Article 
explains how these two legal regimes intersect. In the lawyer-client 
setting, there is an overriding expectation of confidentiality, with only 
limited exceptions to confidentiality. In the government setting, by 
contrast, there is an expectation of transparency, with important but 
limited exceptions to that transparency. This part of the Article examines 
the theoretical underpinnings for confidentiality and transparency in the 
lawyer-client and government settings, respectively. 
A. Secrecy in Lawyer-Client Relationships 
The secrecy of lawyer-client information is protected by two distinct 
legal doctrines that are sometimes conflated: the lawyer’s confidentiality 
duty and the attorney-client privilege. The lawyer’s confidentiality duty 
prevents a lawyer from voluntarily disclosing a client’s information.22 
Under the professional rules, lawyers owe clients a confidentiality 
obligation that is both strict and broad. Most states require lawyers to keep 
confidential all “information relating to representation” unless a client 
consents to disclosure or unless another specific exception applies.23 The 
confidentiality obligation applies not just to information that the client has 
told the lawyer in confidence, but to all other factual information that the 
lawyer learns in connection with the representation.24 The confidentiality 
 
 
M-68-81 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 27, 1981) (on file with author). Later, President Ronald Reagan pardoned 
Felt and his law license was restored. In re W. Mark Felt, No. M-68-81 (D.C. Cir. June 21, 1982) (on 
file with author). Years later, the D.C. Court of Appeals decided that it could still discipline a lawyer 
for conduct that was subject to a presidential pardon. In re Abrams, 689 A.2d 6, 2325 (D.C. 1997) 
(censuring former Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams for giving false testimony to Congress in 
connection with the Iran-Contra scandal).  
 22. The confidentiality duty also prohibits a lawyer from using client information for the 
lawyer’s or someone else’s benefit to the disadvantage of the client. This prohibition is in a distinct 
professional rule. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(b) & cmt. 5 (2007). 
 23. Model Rule 1.6(a) states: “A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the 
representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly 
authorized in order to carry out the representation or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b).” Id. 
R. 1.6(a). Model Rule 1.6(b) sets out exceptions. 
 A few states use an older, narrower formulation of the confidentiality obligation, requiring 
lawyers to keep confidential only information that the client has told the lawyer in confidence and 
information that could be detrimental to the client if disclosed. See, e.g., D.C. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.6; ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6. This formulation comes from the ABA 
Model Code Disciplinary Rule 4-101, which states that “a lawyer shall not knowingly . . . [r]eveal a 
confidence or secret of his client.” MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1980).  
 24. The confidentiality obligation applies to the factual information that the lawyer learns about a 
client’s situation (and any other factual information), but does not apply to the legal expertise that a 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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duty continues even after the representation has ended.25 Lawyers who 
violate the duty of confidentiality can be disciplined by bar authorities or 
held liable to their clients for breach of fiduciary duty.26 
The principle underlying the confidentiality duty is the lawyer’s status 
as a fiduciary and the client’s status as a beneficiary. The client entrusts 
the lawyer with information so that the lawyer can provide a service to the 
client. The information belongs to the client, and it would be 
misappropriation for a lawyer to disclose or use the information, just as it 
would be misappropriation for a lawyer to use a client’s financial asset for 
the lawyer’s benefit. 
A lawyer’s confidentiality duty is subject to several exceptions, and 
these exceptions reflect a policy judgment that a client’s interest in 
confidentiality may give way to a societal interest (such as the prevention 
of crime, fraud, bodily harm, and death27) or even the lawyer’s interest 
(such as the lawyer’s need to obtain legal advice or defend herself).28 Two 
 
 
lawyer develops in a particular area of the law. RESTATEMENT THIRD OF THE LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS § 59 cmt. e. 
 25. There is some support for the notion that the client’s interest in confidentiality diminishes 
over time. See Bonnie Hobbs, Note, Lawyers’ Papers: Confidentiality Versus the Claims of History, 
49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 179, 204–08 (1992) (discussing an implied “historical interest” exception 
allowing lawyers to donate their papers to archives and historians and others to examine these 
documents decades after the matters have closed, even without client consent). But see Swidler & 
Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403–11 (1998) (attorney-client privilege survives the death of 
the client).  
 26. See, e.g., In re Gemmer, 566 N.E.2d 528, 529, 533 (Ind. 1991) (lawyer suspended from 
practice of law for three years for, inter alia, writing letter to tax authorities asserting that former client 
did not have any documentary support for his position); In re Nelson, 327 N.W.2d 576, 579 (Minn. 
1982) (lawyer suspended for six months for “attempt[ing] to use clients’ confidences to their detriment 
and to his own advantage”); In re Metrik, 240 N.Y.S.2d 443, 444 (N.Y. App. Div. 1963) (lawyers 
censured for revealing confidences unnecessarily in a fee dispute with former client); Grutman Katz 
Greene & Humphrey v. Goldman, N.Y. L.J., June 11, 1996, at 27 (lawyer breached fiduciary duty 
when he revealed confidential information about his former clients in his book, Lawyers and Thieves); 
Bar Ass’n v. Watkins, 427 N.E.2d 516, 517 (Ohio 1981) (lawyer suspended indefinitely from practice 
of law for revealing client confidence); In re Pressly, 628 A.2d 927, 928–29, 931 (Vt. 1993) (lawyer 
reprimanded for revealing against client’s will her suspicion that her husband had sexually abused 
their daughter); Thiery v. Bye, Bye, Goff & Rohde, Ltd., 597 N.W.2d 449, 451, 453 (Wis. 1999) 
(lawyer sued for breach of fiduciary duty for disclosing confidential client information while teaching 
college course); In re Rader, 359 N.W.2d 156, 159–60 (Wis. 1984) (lawyer suspended for ninety days 
for revealing client confidences). 
 27. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (to prevent death or substantial bodily 
harm); id. R. 1.6(b)(2) (to prevent client from committing crime or fraud using the lawyer’s services); 
id. R. 1.6(b)(3) (to prevent, mitigate, or rectify financial injury caused by a client’s crime or fraud, 
where client is using the lawyer’s services). 
 28. Id. R. 1.6(b)(4) (to obtain legal advice); id. R. 1.6(b)(5) (to establish claim or defense in 
lawyer’s dispute with client, or to establish defense to criminal charge or civil claim against lawyer). 
While most states have adopted the Model Rules, the confidentiality exceptions vary considerably 
from state to state. See SUSAN R. MARTYN, LAWRENCE J. FOX & W. BRADLEY WENDEL, THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS 2006–2007 EDITION: NATIONAL RULES, STANDARDS, STATUTES, AND STATE 
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other exceptions actually further client interests. First, a lawyer may reveal 
otherwise confidential information if the client gives informed consent.29 
This consent exception recognizes that clients have autonomy and can 
consent to conduct that would otherwise constitute a violation of fiduciary 
duty if done without consent. Second, a lawyer representing an entity 
client may under certain circumstances disclose otherwise confidential 
information in order to protect the entity from a disloyal employee.30 If an 
entity’s lawyer learns that an entity employee has engaged in serious 
wrongdoing that could harm the entity or that could be attributed to it, the 
lawyer is required to refer the matter to a higher authority within the entity 
and ensure that the entity adequately addresses the issue.31 If the higher 
authority fails to adequately address the issue, then the lawyer may reveal 
the information outside the entity in order to prevent substantial injury to 
the entity.32 This exception recognizes that entity clients sometimes need 
to be protected from their agents and that outside disclosure may be 
necessary to effect that protection. 
The attorney-client privilege, by contrast, is an evidentiary privilege. In 
court and other official proceedings, the state can compel individuals and 
entities to provide information unless a privilege prevents such mandatory 
disclosure. The attorney-client privilege prevents the state from requiring 
the disclosure of certain communications between a lawyer and client 
regarding legal representation. The privilege is narrow in scope and covers 
only those communications between a lawyer and client that were made in 
confidence and for the purposes of providing or obtaining legal advice.33 If 
the client reveals the contents of the lawyer-client communication to 
anyone, then the client waives the privilege.34  
 
 
LAWYER CODES 112–19 Ch. (2006) (“State Lawyer Code Exceptions to Client Confidentiality That 
Permit (May) or Require (Must) Disclosure”). 
 29. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a). This Article argues that open government 
laws should be construed as client consent to disclosure. See infra Part III.B. 
 30. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b). The ABA added this exception when it 
adopted revised Model Rule 1.13 in the wake of the Enron and Worldcom scandals and the passage of 
Sarbanes-Oxley. Roger C. Cramton, George M. Cohen & Susan P. Koniak, Legal and Ethical Duties 
of Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VILL. L. REV. 725, 732–33 (2004). Twenty-two states have 
adopted this additional entity-based exception to confidentiality. See THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD 
D. ROTUNDA, 2008 SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 165–67 Ch. (2008) 
(“Chart of Ethics Rule on Disclosure Outside the Organization”). 
 31. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2007). 
 32. Id. R. 1.13(c). This rule and its confidentiality exception is relevant to a government lawyer if 
that lawyer’s client is an entity (such as a government agency) rather than a particular government 
official. See infra Part II (discussing government client identity). 
 33. RESTATEMENT THIRD OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 (2000).  
 34. Id. § 79. 
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The principle underlying the attorney-client privilege is the recognition 
that the public interest in the availability of evidence sometimes must give 
way to the countervailing interest of individuals and entities in obtaining 
legal advice to guide their actions. The privilege is based on two 
assumptions: first, that a lawyer can adequately advise a client only if the 
client provides complete information about the circumstances relevant to 
the legal issue, and second, that a client will communicate that information 
only if assured that the communication is protected by the attorney-client 
privilege.35  
The confidentiality duty is robust. Even if a client recounts to a third 
party the client’s conversation with his lawyer, the lawyer must still keep 
that information confidential. The attorney-client privilege, by contrast, is 
easily lost through waiver. If the client has shared the information with a 
third party, then the client can no longer claim the protection of the 
privilege to prevent mandatory disclosure in a state proceeding.  
The professional rules seem to require lawyers to keep client 
information confidential in perpetuity.36 Some commentators have argued 
for a “historical interest” exception to confidentiality that would allow 
disclosure long after the representation has ended.37 At present there is no 
formal recognition of a “historical interest” exception to lawyer 
confidentiality.  
In the government setting, by contrast, one can find support for the idea 
that the government’s interest in confidentiality diminishes after time. In 
 
 
 35. Id. § 68 cmt. c (identifying also a third assumption that clients need to consult lawyers in 
order to vindicate rights and comply with legal obligations). For an excellent critique of the second 
empirical assumption, see Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351 (1989).  
 For clients who might be subject to criminal prosecution, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the 
Constitution also provide additional bases for protecting lawyer-client communications from 
compelled disclosure.  
 36. See Legal Ethics Advisory Panel, Okla. Bar Ass’n, Op. 301 (1983), reprinted in [Ethics 
Opinions 1980–1985] Laws. Man. of Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA), at 801:7001 (June 25, 1986) (lawyer 
may not donate papers with client confidences and secrets to libraries without express client consent); 
Legal Ethics Comm., D.C. Bar, Op. 128 (1983), reprinted in [Ethics Opinions 1980–1985] Laws. Man. 
of Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA), at 801:2308 (July 19, 1983) (lawyers may not donate their papers to 
university archive unless they get clients’ consent or delete from the papers all client confidences and 
secrets); see also Hobbs, supra note 25, at 200–02; Patrick Shilling, Note, Attorney Papers, History 
and Confidentiality: A Proposed Amendment to Model Rule 1.6, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2741, 2751 
(2001). Despite this apparent perpetual obligation, some lawyers have donated papers containing 
confidential client information to archives, apparently breaching confidentiality. See Shilling, supra, at 
2757 (D.C. lawyer Joseph Rauh donated his papers to the Library of Congress with the stipulation that 
if historians or journalists wanted to publish information about living clients or those with active 
estates, they had to seek clients’ consent). 
 37. Hobbs, supra note 25, at 202 (proposing amendment to confidentiality rule so that a lawyer 
may donate her papers to a library twenty-five years after the client’s death). 
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Attorney-General v. Jonathan Cape Ltd., a British court was asked to 
enjoin publication of a former cabinet minister’s memoir because it 
revealed confidential cabinet deliberations.38 The court acknowledged that 
cabinet discussions are confidential in character, but noted that there was 
no single rule regarding how long such discussions must be kept 
confidential and observed that different types of information require 
different lengths of confidentiality.39 The court explained that at some 
point the government’s interest in the confidentiality of these discussions 
would lapse, but noted the difficulty in determining exactly when that 
would occur.40 The court ruled that it should enjoin publication only if the 
continuing confidentiality of the material could be clearly demonstrated 
and concluded that this was not that case.41  
In the national security field there is a presumption that confidential 
national security–related information can be released ten years after its 
creation, unless the sensitivity of the information requires that automatic 
declassification occur in twenty-five years.42 One also finds some support 
for the concept of diminishing confidentiality over time with respect to the 
secrecy of criminal investigations. Courts have noted that the need for 
secrecy may end when the investigation ends.43 On occasion, courts have 
 
 
 38. (1975) 3 All E.R. 484 (Q.B.).   
 39. Id. at 495. The court wrote that 
[s]ome secrets require a high standard of protection for a short time. Others require protection 
until a new political generation has taken over. . . . Secrets relating to national security may 
require to be preserved indefinitely. Secrets relating to new taxation proposals may be of the 
highest importance until Budget day, but public knowledge thereafter. To leak a Cabinet 
decision a day or so before it is officially announced is an accepted exercise in public 
relations . . . . It is evident that there cannot be a single rule governing the publication of such 
a variety of matters. 
Id. at 492, 495. 
 40. Id. at 496. 
 41.  Id. (“In less clear cases—and this, in my view, is certainly one—reliance must be placed on 
the good sense and good taste of the minister or ex-minister concerned.”). 
 42.  Exec. Order No. 13,292 §§ 1.5(b), 3.3(a), 3 C.F.R. 196, 198–99, 203 (2003); see id. § 3.3(b), 
3 C.F.R. at 203 (identifying factors that can rebut the presumption of declassification); id. § 4.4(a), 3 
C.F.R. at 209–10 (permitting access to classified information by historians as well as former high-level 
government officials, presumably to assist them in the writing of their memoirs); see also President 
John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (2000). Some 
previous executive orders have included automatic declassification after varying lengths of time. See, 
e.g., Exec. Order No. 11,652 § 5.A (1972). 
 43.  See, e.g., Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 632–33 (1990). In Butterworth, the Supreme 
Court struck down a Florida statute that imposed a permanent ban on grand jury witnesses’ disclosing 
their own testimony because 
[w]hen an investigation ends, there is no longer a need to keep information from the targeted 
individual in order to prevent his escape—that individual presumably will have been 
exonerated, on the one hand, or arrested or otherwise informed of the charges against him, on 
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noted that some government interests in secrecy diminish over time,44 and 
have ruled that the historical significance of particular events combined 
with “the long passage of time”—measured in decades—may justify 
disclosure of secret grand jury proceedings.45  
B. Secrecy and Transparency in Government 
While the overriding norm regarding lawyer-client information is 
secrecy unless there is a good reason for disclosure, the overriding norm 
regarding government information in the modern era is disclosure unless 
there is a good reason for secrecy. One finds this principle not in the U.S. 
Constitution, but in constitutive statutes that determine how governments 
will operate. The federal open government laws include the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA),46 Privacy Act of 1974,47 Government in the 
Sunshine Act,48 Federal Advisory Committee Act,49 and the Presidential 
Records Act of 1978.50 These statutes establish a baseline of providing the 
public with access to government information, both in terms of 
government documents and government meetings. Under the FOIA, 
executive-branch agencies are required to publish their rules, regulations, 
 
 
the other. There is also no longer a need to prevent the importuning of grand jurors since their 
deliberations will be over. 
Id. (footnote call number omitted); see also Brown v. Thompson, 430 F.2d 1214, 1215 (5th Cir. 1970) 
(privilege preventing discovery of police investigative files “will expire upon the lapse of an 
unreasonable length of time”). 
 44.  In re Am. Historical Ass’n, 49 F. Supp. 2d 274, 292, 295, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating that 
some of the justifications for grand jury secrecy—such as protecting grand jury witnesses from 
retaliation or tampering—“dissolve[]” when the appeals of any convictions are complete, that “fifty 
years after the proceedings [had] ended . . . [t]he inhibiting effect of . . . disclosure is insignificant,” 
that the public’s interest in establishing an accurate historical record may strengthen over time, and 
that “[t]he public must acquire, at an appropriate time, a significant, if not compelling, interest in 
ensuring the pages of history are based upon the fullest possible record”). 
 45.  In re Am. Historical Ass’n, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 293–94 (granting partial disclosure of grand 
jury proceedings related to Alger Hiss investigation). See also In re May, 13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 
2198, 2199 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (granting disclosure thirty-five years after grand jury investigation of 
William Walter Remington); In re O’Brien, No. 3-90-X-95 (M.D. Tenn. May 16, 1990) (granting 
disclosure forty-five years after grand jury investigation), cited in In re Am. Historical Ass’n, 49 F. 
Supp. 2d at 293. But see In re Craig, 131 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1997) (denying historian access to 1948 
grand jury investigation). Note that similar requests for disclosure of grand jury materials were denied 
in 1977 in Hiss v. Dep’t of Justice, 441 F. Supp. 69, 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (ruling under the Freedom of 
Information Act that the historical significance of the Alger Hiss grand jury investigation did not 
provide an exception to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)’s requirement of grand jury secrecy).  
 46. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000). 
 47. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000). 
 48. 5 U.S.C. § 552b (2000). 
 49. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1–16 (2000). 
 50. 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2207 (2000). 
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and policies; final opinions made in the adjudication of cases; and 
information about how the agencies are organized.51 The statute makes all 
other government documents public upon request, unless there is a good 
reason for the government to keep the document secret.52 The FOIA sets 
out nine specific exceptions to this mandated disclosure upon request.53 
When someone seeks disclosure of government information, there is a 
presumption that the information will be made available. Where the 
government refuses to disclose it, the burden is on the government to 
justify the refusal.54 This presumption in favor of disclosure is consistent 
with principles of robust democratic government. 
Our government is based on the premise that the government is of, for, 
and by the people.55 But if the people do not have access to information 
about what the government is doing, then this premise is little more than 
an empty promise.56 One can find a constitutional basis for the right to 
know only indirectly in the U.S. Constitution.57 The First Amendment 
prohibits the government from restricting the freedom of press, but does 
not directly give the press access to government information. On the other 
hand, the First Amendment does ensure that government employees may 
speak about their work unless there is a compelling reason to restrict their 
speech.58  
 
 
 51. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)–(a)(2) (2000). 
 52. Id. § 552(a)(3), (b). 
 53. Id. § 552(b). 
 54. Id. § 552(a)(4)(B) (where a requester appeals an agency’s denial of information “the burden 
is on the agency to sustain its action”). 
 55. President Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), available at http://www. 
ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?doc=36&page=transcript. 
 56. Letter from James Madison to William T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), available at 
http://1stam.umn.edu/main/historic/Madison_letter_1822.htm (“A popular Government without 
popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, 
perhaps both.”). 
 57. See Thomas I. Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 
23–24 (1976); Seth F. Kreimer, The Freedom of Information Act and the Ecology of Transparency, 10 
U. PA. J. CON. L. (forthcoming 2008) (“[T]he body of the Constitution provides no right to public 
information. What the Constitutional text omits, the last generation has embedded as a part of modern 
constitutional practice in the Freedom of Information Act.”). 
 58. United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1313 (4th Cir. 1972) (“[T]he First Amendment 
limits the extent to which the United States . . . may impose secrecy requirements upon its employees  
. . . . It precludes such restraints with respect to information which is unclassified . . . .”). 
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C. Harmonizing the Lawyer-Client Secrecy Norm with the Governmental 
Openness Norm  
Returning to the story that began this section, how would one evaluate 
Mark Felt’s disclosure of the details of the FBI’s Watergate investigation 
if Felt had been acting as a lawyer? This analysis requires several 
counterfactual assumptions. First, one must identify Felt’s client. Felt 
believed that his primary loyalty was to the FBI.59 When the White House 
attempted to thwart the FBI’s Watergate investigation, Felt was severely 
limited in what he could do through official government channels. The 
FBI could investigate the connections between the Watergate burglars and 
other activities of the Nixon reelection campaign only with the permission 
of the Justice Department, which was under the control of the White 
House. So Felt went outside of official government channels and used his 
leaks of information to Woodward to spur congressional and public 
pressure for a more complete investigation of the Watergate–White House 
ties.  
Applying today’s legal ethics standards to this situation, could Felt 
legally justify his disclosures to Woodward? The exception that comes 
closest is the entity exception to confidentiality.60 While Felt had primary 
loyalty to the FBI, it would be more accurate to identify his putative client 
as the executive branch of the federal government.61 Under the current 
ethics rule for entity clients, if Felt knew that executive-branch officials 
had engaged in “a violation of law that reasonably might be imputed to” 
the executive branch and that was “likely to result in substantial injury to” 
the branch, then he had an obligation to “refer the matter to higher 
authority.”62 In this situation, higher authority would be the Director of the 
FBI, the Attorney General, and the President. There is no indication that 
Felt ever confronted any of these officials over the alleged transgressions. 
So even under the current more lax confidentiality rules now in place, Felt 
would not be able to legally justify his leaking this information to 
Woodward.  
 
 
 59. O’Connor, supra note 16, at 130. 
 60. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(c) (2007). 
 61. See infra Part II. 
 62. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2007). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss5/2
p 1033 Clark book pages.doc  5/20/2008 11:28:00 AM  
 
 
 
 
 
2007] GOVERNMENT LAWYERS AND CONFIDENTIALITY NORMS 1049 
 
 
 
 
II. IDENTIFYING THE CLIENT OF A GOVERNMENT LAWYER 
In 2000, Cindy Ossias was a lawyer in the California Insurance 
Department, where she investigated California insurance 
companies. Ossias had investigated the companies’ practices in 
settling cases arising out of the 1994 Northridge earthquake, 
concluded that the companies had violated state law, and 
recommended that the companies be fined. Instead, California 
Insurance Commissioner Chuck Quackenbush, the head of the 
Insurance Department and an elected official, authorized secret 
settlements under which the companies would donate to private 
foundations formed by Quackenbush. When Ossias learned of these 
secret settlements, she believed they were improper and disclosed 
them to state legislators who were investigating the Insurance 
Department. When Quackenbush discovered that Ossias had 
disclosed this information to the legislators, he placed her on 
administrative leave, and state bar authorities investigated whether 
Ossias had violated her professional duty of confidentiality.63 
Ossias argued that her disclosure was authorized by state 
whistleblower protection laws, and bar authorities ultimately 
decided not to discipline her.64 The state bar proposed a rule 
allowing government lawyers to disclose government misconduct, 
but the state supreme court rejected the proposed rule.65 The 
California legislature passed legislation that would have clarified 
that a government lawyer does not violate confidentiality by 
 
 
 63. As a California lawyer, Ossias was bound by the California Business and Professions Code 
§ 6068(e)(1), which states that a lawyer must “maintain inviolate the confidence . . . and . . . preserve 
the secrets . . . of his or her client.” CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e)(1) (West Supp. 2007). The 
statutory duty of confidentiality has an exception for disclosure that “is necessary to prevent a criminal 
act that the attorney reasonably believes is likely to result in death of, or substantial bodily harm to, an 
individual.” Id. § 6068(c)(2); see also CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-100(A), (B) (2008) 
(providing a similar exception and an additional exception when the client gives informed consent). 
For an extensive discussion of Ossias’s case, see Doskow, supra note 10, at 24–26; see also Radack, 
supra note 10, at 126, 138–40. 
 64. Letter from Donald R. Steedman, Deputy Trial Counsel, State Bar of Cal., to Richard Alan 
Zitrin, Attorney for Cindy Ossais (Oct. 11, 2000), available at Response by Respondent to Bar Ass’ns 
Counter Statement at 21–22 app., In re Schafer, No. 00031 (Wash. State Bar Ass’n Dec. 7, 2000), 
http://www.dougschafer.com/Response2Bar.pdf. One might argue that the decision of the California 
bar authorities not to discipline Ossias indicates that government lawyers in California may disclose 
otherwise confidential information about government wrongdoing. But a decision not to discipline has 
no precedential value and would provide little comfort for a lawyer seeking definitive guidance on her 
ethical obligations.  
 65. Doskow, supra note 10, at 23. The proposal can be found at http://www.calbar.ca.gov/calbar/ 
pdfs/rule3-600request.pdf. 
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disclosing government wrongdoing, but the Governor vetoed the 
legislation.66  
 To whom did Ossias owe a duty of confidentiality? Was it to the 
California Insurance Department, or its head, Chuck 
Quackenbush? The government of California? The people of 
California?  
A. A Wide Range of Possible Clients 
Government officials, courts, and commentators have identified a wide 
variety of possible clients that the government lawyer might represent.67 
One can find some support for the following as clients: the “public 
interest,”68 the public at large,69 the entire government,70 the branch of 
 
 
 66. State Bar of California, Office of Governmental Affairs, Governor Vetoes Public Attorney 
Whistleblower Bill, SACRAMENTO SCENE, Oct. 4, 2002, at 1, available at http://www.calbar.ca.gov/ 
calbar/pdfs/legis/Newsletter1-37.pdf. The text of the bill is available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/ 
01-02/bill/asm/ab_0351-0400/ab_363_bill_20020828_enrolled.html. The veto message is available at 
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/01-02/bill/asm/ab_0351-0400/ab_363_vt_20020930.html. 
 67. For other discussions of the range of possible clients of government lawyers, see Cramton, 
supra note 10, at 296 (identifying five possible clients of government attorney: public interest, 
government as a whole, branch of government, agency, and particular officer who makes decisions for 
agency); Bruce A. Green, Must Government Lawyers “Seek Justice” In Civil Litigation?, 9 WIDENER 
J. PUB. L. 235, 266–69 (2000); Joshua Panas, The Miguel Estrada Confirmation Hearings and the 
Client of a Government Lawyer, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 541 (2004). 
 Two types of lawyers employed by the government have no client at all because they are not 
acting as lawyers in a representative capacity: judges, see infra text accompanying note 121, and 
administrators, such as former Secretary of State Warren Christopher and former Director of Central 
Intelligence William Webster. 
 68. Feeney v. Commonwealth, 366 N.E.2d 1262, 1266 (Mass. 1977) (“‘[The Attorney General] 
also has a common law duty to represent the public interest’” in his representation of the 
Commonwealth and specific Commonwealth officers being sued (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12 § 3 
(2002)); Sec’y of Admin. & Fin. v. Att’y Gen., 326 N.E.2d 334, 338–39 (Mass. 1975) (same); Barbara 
Allen Babcock, Defending the Government: Justice and the Civil Division, 23 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 
181, 185, 190 (1990) (asserting that the government lawyer must serve the public interest as well as a 
specific agency and the government as a whole); Keith W. Donahoe, Note, The Model Rules and the 
Government Lawyer, A Sword or Shield? A Response to the D.C. Bar Special Committee on 
Government Lawyers and The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 987, 
1000 (1989) (“The client of the government lawyer should be the public interest.”); see also In re 
Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1273 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“Unlike a private practitioner, the loyalties of a 
government lawyer . . . cannot and must not lie solely with his or her client agency.”); Superintendent 
of Ins. v. Att’y Gen., 558 A.2d 1197, 1199–1200, 1202 (Me. 1989) (referring to government lawyers’ 
representation of “both the public interest and public agencies” in ruling that the state attorney general 
is not obligated to represent the superintendent of insurance in an action seeking review of a rate order 
issued by the superintendent). 
 69. In re Witness Before Special Grand Jury 2000–2, 288 F.3d 289, 294 (7th Cir. 2002) (refusing 
to recognize former state secretary of state’s assertion of attorney-client privilege regarding his 
conversation with lawyers because, inter alia, a government attorney owes “ultimate allegiance” to 
“public citizens . . . as represented by the grand jury”); Conn. Comm’n on Special Revenue v. Conn. 
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government employing the lawyer,71 the particular agency employing the 
lawyer,72 and a particular government official (such as the head of a 
 
 
Freedom of Info. Comm’n, 387 A.2d. 533, 538 (Conn. 1978) (“[T]he real client of the attorney general 
is the people of the state.”); Levitt v. Att’y Gen., 151 A. 171, 174 (Conn. 1930) (state attorney 
general’s “duty as a lawyer [is] to protect the interest of his client, the people of the state”); Times 
Publ’g Co. v. Williams, 222 So. 2d 470, 475 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (referring to “the public” as the 
government lawyer’s “real client” in a case examining the effect of state open meeting laws on 
confidential government lawyer-client consultations); Humphrey v. McLaren, 402 N.W.2d 535, 540–
41, 543 (Minn. 1987) (stating that a government attorney “has for a client the public, a client that 
includes the general populace even though this client assumes its immediate identity through its 
various governmental agencies” and ruling that the state attorney general is not disqualified from suing 
the former head of a state agency because he never represented the head of the agency); W.J. Michael 
Cody, Special Ethical Duties for Attorneys Who Hold Public Positions, 23 MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REV. 
453, 457 (1993) (“the people of the states are [the] clients” of state Attorneys General); Charles Fahy, 
Special Ethical Problems of Counsel for the Government, 33 FED. BAR J. 331, 332 (1974) (the 
government lawyer’s client is “the people as a whole”); Patricia M. Wald, “For the United States”: 
Government Lawyers in Court, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1998, at 107, 110 (“[T]he 
government lawyer’s client is seen as being . . . the U.S. citizenry at large, a client whose ultimate 
objective is that justice be done.”). But see In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d 527, 533–34 (2d 
Cir. 2005) (rejecting federal government’s assertion that the court should not recognize Connecticut 
governor’s assertion of attorney-client privilege because a lawyer’s “loyalty to the Governor . . . must 
yield to her loyalty to the public, to whom she owes ultimate allegiance when violations of the 
criminal law are at stake”).  
 Some have asserted that while the government lawyer may have a more immediate client (such as 
a government agency), she also represents the public. Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, 716 F.2d 23, 33 
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (asserting in dicta that “government counsel have a higher duty to uphold because 
their client is not only the agency they represent but also the public at large”); Griffin B. Bell, The 
Attorney General: The Federal Government’s Chief Lawyer and Chief Litigator, or One Among 
Many?, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1049, 1069 (1978) (“Although our client is the government, in the end 
we serve a more important constituency: the American people.”); Jack B. Weinstein & Gay A. 
Crosthwait, Some Reflections on Conflicts Between Government Attorneys and Clients, 1 TOURO L. 
REV. 1, 4–5 (1985) (“[Government lawyers] represent not only the government entity, but also the 
public.”); Justin G. Davids, Note, State Attorneys General and the Client-Attorney Relationship: 
Establishing the Power to Sue State Officers, 38 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 365, 412 (2005) (“State 
attorneys general . . . owe allegiances to two clients—the ‘people’ and the executive officers and 
agencies.”). 
 70. Lawry, Wrong Question, supra note 10, at 66 (“[T]he client of the federal government lawyer 
is the federal government.”); see also James R. Harvey III, Note, Loyalty in Government Litigation: 
Department of Justice Representation of Agency Clients, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1569, 1575–76, 
1594 (1996) (noting that “the Solicitor General[’s] . . . client is most often the government as a whole, 
or the executive branch in particular, rather than an individual agency”). 
 71. Geoffrey P. Miller, Government Lawyers’ Ethics in a System of Checks and Balances, 54 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1293, 1298 (1987) (“[T]he duties of an [executive branch] agency attorney run to the 
executive branch generally rather than to the agency only. . . . [T]he attorney’s obligation is most 
reasonably seen as running to the executive branch as a whole and to the President as its head.”); cf. 
Babcock, supra note 68, at 185 (asserting that the Justice Department’s client is sometimes “the 
Congress whose legislation is under attack”). 
 72. D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(k) (2007) (stating that “[t]he client of the 
government lawyer is the agency that employs the lawyer unless expressly provided to the contrary by 
appropriate law, regulation, or order”); see In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 
915–21 (8th Cir. 1997) (asserting that “the White House is the real party in interest in this case” and 
refusing to recognize attorney-client privilege for a lawyer’s notes of a conversation with then First 
Lady when they were sought by a federal grand jury); Prof’l Ethics Comm., Fed. Bar Ass’n Op. 73-1 
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government organization) in his official or individual capacity.73  
In some situations a government lawyer is assigned to defend an 
individual government employee rather than represent a government 
entity. Such is routinely the case for Judge Advocate General military 
defense lawyers, who take on a traditional lawyer-client relationship with 
their individual clients.74 Justice Department lawyers representing 
government officials who have been sued in their individual capacity face 
a more complex situation. Federal government lawyers represent 
individual government officials only if the Attorney General has 
determined that it is “in the interest of the United States” to provide such 
representation.75 Under Justice Department regulations, the government 
lawyer’s confidentiality duty toward her individual client is more limited 
than in a traditional lawyer-client relationship. The lawyer must keep 
confidential only that information that is covered by the attorney-client 
 
 
(1973) (“The Government Client and Confidentiality”), in 32 FED. B.J. 71, 72 (1973) (“[T]he client of 
the federally employed lawyer . . . is the agency where he is employed, including those charged with 
its administration insofar as they are engaged in the conduct of the public business.”); FED. BAR 
ASS’N, MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (1990) (“[A] Government lawyer represents the 
Federal Agency that employs the Government lawyer.”); D.C. BAR, REPORT BY THE DISTRICT OF 
COLUMBIA BAR SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT LAWYERS AND THE MODEL RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, reprinted in WASH. LAW., Sept.–Oct. 1988, at 53, 54 [hereinafter D.C. BAR 
REPORT] (“[T]he employing agency should in normal circumstances be considered the client of the 
government lawyer.”); Cramton, supra note 10, at 298 (“For day-to-day operating purposes, the 
government lawyer may properly view as his or her client the particular agency by which the lawyer is 
employed.”). 
 73. The Attorney General’s Role as Chief Litigator for the United States, 6 Op. Off. Legal 
Counsel 47, 54 (1982) (stating that the President is the client of the Attorney General); Bruce E. Fein, 
Promoting the President’s Policies Through Legal Advocacy: An Ethical Imperative of the 
Government Attorney, 30 FED. B. NEWS & J. 406, 406 (1983) (referring to “the incumbent President” 
as the client of “a government attorney in the Executive Branch”); Harvey, supra note 70, at 1607–12 
(suggesting that the President might appropriately be viewed as the client whenever a federal agency is 
involved in litigation).  
 As a practical matter, there may not be much difference between identifying the client as an 
agency and identifying the client as the head of the agency in her official capacity. The latter 
formulation simply makes explicit who is empowered to make decisions on behalf of the agency. But 
in certain circumstances, the difference in conception is significant. Lawyers licensed in states that 
have adopted the new Model Rule 1.13 on entity representation have an additional exception to 
confidentiality if their client is the agency rather than the individual heading the agency. See MODEL 
RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.13(c) (2007). 
 74. See D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 39 (2007) (noting that government lawyers 
may “be assigned to provide an individual with counsel or representation,” such as “a public defender, 
a government lawyer representing a defendant sued for damages arising out of the performance of the 
defendant’s government employment, and a military lawyer representing a court-martial defendant”); 
Legal Ethics Comm., D.C. Bar, Op. 313, available at http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/ethics/legal_ 
ethics/opinions/opinion313.cfm (explaining that a JAG lawyer’s client is an individual defendant 
rather than the government). 
 75. 28 C.F.R. § 50.15(a) (2007). 
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privilege.76 Any nonprivileged information need not be held confidential, 
and Justice Department attorneys have been required to disclose 
information adverse to their individual client where the lawyer learned it 
from a source other than a client communication.77  
In most situations, the government lawyer represents a government 
entity rather than an individual government employee.78 While the 
professional rules provide guidance for entity representation,79 they 
generally leave open the key question for government lawyers: which 
government entity does the lawyer represent?80  
The identity of the client has important implications for lawyer 
confidentiality. If a government lawyer represents “the people,” then 
presumably she could disclose information to anyone who is one of “the 
people.”81 If a government lawyer represents an agency, then the entity 
exception to confidentiality will apply,82 but if she is representing the 
agency head, then it will not.83 If a Justice Department lawyer represents 
 
 
 76. Id. § 50.15(a)(3) (“Justice Department attorneys who represent an employee under this 
section also undertake a full and traditional attorney-client relationship with the employee with respect 
to the attorney-client privilege.”). 
 77. Memorandum from Ralph W. Tarr, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to 
Ralph K. Willard, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Div. 6 (Mar. 29, 1985) (on file with author).  
 This approach—providing only limited confidentiality to a government employee client—may no 
longer be sustainable. The Tarr memorandum asserts that the United States Constitution’s Supremacy 
Clause will prevent state bar authorities from disciplining a government lawyer who reveals (non-
privileged) information in violation of state legal-ethics rules. Id. at 9 n.7. But in 1998, Congress 
passed the McDade Amendment, which prohibits the Justice Department from using the Supremacy 
Clause to opt out of state ethics rules. Act of Oct. 21, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, sec. 101(b), 
§§ 801(a), 112 Stat. 2681, 2681–118 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 530B(a) (2000)) (“An attorney for the 
Government shall be subject to State laws and rules, and local Federal court rules, governing attorneys 
in each State where such attorney engages in that attorney’s duties, to the same extent and in the same 
manner as other attorneys in that State.”).  
 78. E.g., Ward v. Superior Court, 138 Cal. Rptr. 532, 538 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that 
county counsel represented county rather than former assessor, so there was no conflict of interest in 
counsel’s defending county in assessor’s defamation action against county); Humphrey v. McLaren, 
402 N.W.2d 535, 540–41 (Minn. 1987) (holding that state attorney general represented state agency 
rather than agency’s executive director, so there was no conflict of interest when attorney general sued 
executive director for misuse of public funds). 
 79. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2007) (organization as client). 
 80. But see D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(k) (2007) (asserting that the government 
lawyer’s client is the agency that employs the lawyer).  
 81. Cf. Roberts v. City of Palmdale, 5 Cal. 4th 363, 380 n.5 (1993) (rejecting resident’s assertion 
that “because the city attorney has a duty to serve the public, she is the client of the city attorney as a 
member of the public and has the authority to waive the privilege”). 
 82. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(c) (2007); see discussion supra notes 30–32 and 
accompanying text. 
 83. As a practical matter, the key difference between conceiving of the client as a government 
agency rather than as the head of the government agency in his official capacity is the Model Rule 1.13 
duty to protect entity clients from disloyal agents. See Ross v. City of Memphis, 423 F.3d 596, 601 
(6th Cir. 2005). In Ross, a city was being sued for alleged civil rights violations by its police force. The 
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the entire government, then she can reveal information to a member of 
Congress, but if she represents the executive branch, she cannot. If a state 
natural resources department lawyer represents her agency, then she 
cannot reveal information about wrongdoing at the department to anyone 
outside of the department, including the state attorney general.84 If a 
lawyer in the California Insurance Department (such as Cindy Ossias) 
represents the entire government of California, then she can reveal 
information to state legislators. But if she represents only the Insurance 
Department, then she cannot—unless an exception to confidentiality 
applies. 
Writing years before the American Bar Association adopted its Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct—including its rule specifically dealing 
with entity clients—Robert Lawry argued that client identity was the 
wrong question for government lawyers to ask.85 Lawry correctly noted 
that identifying the client does not end the inquiry regarding a government 
lawyer’s confidentiality duty.86 But client identity is an appropriate 
starting point for an inquiry about confidentiality. Correctly identifying the 
government lawyer’s client will help the lawyer determine the set of 
individuals to whom she can reveal information.  
Some have attempted to provide a universal answer to the question of 
the identity of the government lawyer’s client. Politicians often claim that 
the government lawyer’s client is “the public,”87 and a few commentators 
 
 
court ruled that the city could assert attorney-client privilege even though the former police director (a 
co-defendant) purported to waive the privilege by defending on the basis of the legal advice he 
received. Id. at 603. As long as the city rather than the police director was the client, the city could 
maintain the privilege. Id. at 605–06.  
 84. But see HAW. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c)(4)–(5) (2007) (permitting government 
lawyers licensed in Hawaii to make such disclosures). 
 85. Lawry, Wrong Question, supra note 10; Lawry, Confidences, supra note 10. The American 
Bar Association adopted its Model Rules of Professional Conduct, including Model Rule 1.13 on 
entity clients, in 1983. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT preface (2007). 
 Steven Berenson has also argued that identifying the government lawyer’s client is unnecessary. 
Steven K. Berenson, Hard Bargaining on Behalf of the Government Tortfeasor: A Study in 
Governmental Lawyer Ethics, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 345, 364 (2005) (“[C]hoosing a single client 
from among the many possibilities mentioned above would be arbitrary . . . .”). He suggests that 
government lawyers should instead “seek guidance from a wide range of the sources . . . [and] serve a 
mediating function in considering how to incorporate those views in the representation.” Id. But this 
approach would often result in indeterminacy.  
 86. Lawry, Confidences, supra note 10, at 631 (“The primary reason this is the wrong question is 
that the answer to it does not automatically answer other, separate questions of immense practical 
importance, not least of which is the question of confidentiality.”). 
 87. Senator Patrick Leahy asserted that the memoranda John Roberts wrote when he was at the 
Solicitor General’s office were not subject to attorney-client privilege because “[t]hose working in the 
solicitor general’s office are not working for the president. They’re working for you and me, and all 
the American people.” Interview by George Stephanopolous with Sen. Patrick Leahy (July 24, 2005) 
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assert that government lawyers should pursue “the public interest.”88 But 
these formulations fail to identify who can give direction to the lawyer on 
behalf of the client.89 Some assert that the government lawyer represents 
the government as a whole,90 but Geoffrey Miller persuasively rebuts that 
notion as it pertains to a government with separated powers.91 Miller notes 
that lawyers in the executive branch do not generally represent Congress 
or the judiciary.92 Many assert that the client is the particular agency that 
employs the lawyer,93 but this approach is singularly inappropriate for the 
hundreds of Justice Department lawyers who represent other government 
agencies and departments in court.  
 
 
(transcript available at http://blog.washingtonpost.com/campaignforthecourt/2005/07/talk_shows_leah. 
html). 
 88. Steven K. Berenson, Public Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should, and Will Government 
Lawyers Serve the Public Interest?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 789 (2000) [hereinafter Berenson, Public 
Lawyers]; see also Berenson, supra note 10. 
 89. See Prof’l Ethics Comm., Fed Bar Ass’n, Op 73-1 (1973) (“The Government Client and 
Confidentiality”) in 32 FED. B.J. 71, 72 (1973) (“[W]e do not suggest . . . that the public is the client as 
the client concept is usually understood.”); see also D.C. BAR REPORT, supra note 72, at 54 
(concluding “that ‘the public interest’ was an unworkable ethical guideline” and that “the ‘public 
interest’ [is] too amorphous a standard to have practical utility in regulating lawyer conduct”); 
Cramton, supra note 10, at 298 (noting that “conceptions of the ‘public interest’ vary significantly 
from one person to the next” and that “defining the government lawyer’s client as the public interest 
would fail to provide any real guidance in regulating lawyers’ conduct”); Harvey, supra note 70, at 
1601 (“The public interest model . . . allows unelected officials to substitute their judgment for that of 
an agency.”); Miller, supra note 10, at 1294–95 (“[T]he notion that government attorneys represent 
some transcendental ‘public interest’ is, I believe, incoherent. . . . [T]here are as many ideas of the 
‘public interest’ as there are people who think about the subject.”).  
 On the other hand, certain government lawyers have client-like decision-making authority, such as 
whether to bring or settle a lawsuit and whether to appeal an adverse court decision. If a lawyer does 
have this client-like authority, she can appropriately consider the public interest in making such 
decisions. See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 90. See Lawry, Wrong Question, supra note 10, at 66 (“[T]he client of the federal government 
lawyer is the federal government.”); see also Harvey, supra note 70, at 1575–76 (regarding the 
Solicitor General in particular). But in a longer article published just a year later, Lawry asserts that 
“‘[t]he client for the federal government lawyer is the head of the agency or department or the head of 
the public or quasi-public body to which the lawyer is currently attached . . . .” Lawry, Confidences, 
supra note 10, at 644.  
 91. Miller, supra note 10, at 1296 (“The notion . . . that an agency attorney serves the 
government as a whole is misplaced.”). 
 92. Id. (“In a system of checks and balances it is not the responsibility of an [executive branch] 
attorney to represent the interests of Congress or the Court. Those [branches] have their own 
‘constitutional means and personal motives’ to protect their prerogatives.” (footnote call number 
omitted)); see also D.C. BAR REPORT, supra note 72, at 55 (“The identification of one’s client as the 
entire government would raise serious questions regarding client control and confidentiality. For 
example, without some focus of responsibility, each government lawyer would be free to perform as 
he or she saw fit, subject only to the practical constraint of internal agency discipline.”).  
 93. D.C. BAR REPORT, supra note 72, at 55; see also Prof’l Ethics Comm., Fed. Bar Ass’n, Op. 
73-1 (1973), in 32 FED. B.J. 71 (1973). 
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There are problems with each of these formulations. Given the wide 
variety of roles that government lawyers play, it is no wonder that a 
universal definition of the government lawyer’s client evades us. The next 
section develops an alternative approach. It identifies the government 
lawyer’s client by examining the specific context in which the government 
lawyer works, paying particular attention to the structure of government 
authority. 
B. Client Identity Depends on Context and Structure of Governmental 
Power 
While there is no universal answer to the question of identifying a 
government lawyer’s client, one can determine a particular government 
lawyer’s client by examining the particular context and the precise 
structure of governmental authority.94 This section describes the process 
for identifying a government lawyer’s client and gives examples of that 
analysis. It does not purport to provide a comprehensive list of clients for 
all government lawyers. Instead, it explains how one can identify a 
particular lawyer’s client and provides some examples of this method.  
To determine the identity of the client, one must examine the range of 
possible clients of the government lawyer and consider the relationships 
among those putative clients. Is one of those entities subordinate to 
another or do they act independently? One must then consider the 
relationship between the lawyer and those entities. A few concrete 
examples will show how complex and contextual the issue of client 
identity can be in the government context.95 
The issue of client identity often comes up in cases involving claims of 
attorney-client privilege or conflicts of interest. For example, an attorney-
client privilege case arose when a federal grand jury subpoenaed the 
 
 
 94. See RESTATEMENT THIRD OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 97 cmt. c (“No universal 
definition of the client of a governmental lawyer is possible.”); Harvey, supra note 70, at 1615–16 
(“[N]o one model completely describes Department loyalty. . . . The varied facts and forces that 
operate in each case of representation make a single model inappropriate for describing the loyalty 
relationship.”); see also Lawry, Wrong Question, supra note 10, at 62–63; Lawry, Confidences, supra 
note 10, at 631–32 (noting that the question of client identity also depends on the particular question 
being asked: confidentiality, conflict of interest, or whether the government lawyer must do what the 
particular government official has instructed).  
 95. See Gray v. R.I. Dep’t of Children, Youth and Families, 937 F. Supp. 153, 157 (D.R.I. 1996) 
(“[A]scertaining who the client really is can be a complex affair when a governmental entity is 
involved.”); United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 86 F.R.D. 603, 617 (D.D.C. 1979) (adopting a 
contextualized approach to identifying the government lawyer’s client, indicating that the client can be 
more than one government agency “if the two agencies have a substantial identity of legal interest in a 
particular matter”). 
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minutes from the Detroit City Council’s closed sessions. The Detroit 
corporation counsel had attended those sessions and the federal prosecutor 
argued that the corporation counsel represented only the executive arm of 
city government, not the Detroit City Council.96 Under this theory, the 
presence of corporation counsel would waive the City Council’s attorney-
client privilege. The Sixth Circuit closely examined the particular legal 
context of these closed sessions, which dealt with condemnation 
proceedings. The Detroit city government is normally bifurcated, with the 
corporation counsel representing the city administration rather than the 
City Council. But in condemnation proceedings, the City Council actually 
instructs the corporation counsel whether to proceed. So, the City Council 
was able to assert attorney-client privilege for its meetings with 
corporation counsel.97 
The Sixth Circuit used a similar structural, contextual approach to 
come to a different conclusion in a case involving Murfreesboro, 
Tennessee city council members, the city manager, and a lawyer for the 
city.98 The issue was again application of the attorney-client privilege. The 
court found that the city-council members were investigating an executive 
decision and had interests adverse to those of the city manager. Thus, the 
city council members were not clients of the city attorney and the city 
could not assert attorney client privilege because the meeting with the 
lawyer occurred with non-clients (i.e., city council members) present.99 
In a California case, the issue was a possible conflict of interest by a 
county counsel who had given legal advice to the county’s civil service 
commission.100 The court ruled that ordinarily a county counsel’s client is 
the entire county rather than a constituent agency of the county, even when 
the lawyer is giving specific legal advice to such an agency. But the court 
identified an exception to this general rule where the agency has the 
authority to act independently of the county.101 In this particular case the 
 
 
 96. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 886 F.2d 135, 137–38 (6th Cir. 1989).  
 97. Id. at 138–39.  
 98. Reed v. Baxter, 134 F.3d 351 (6th Cir. 1998). 
 99. Id. at 357–58. 
 100. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 159, 164 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (“We 
. . . accept the general proposition that a public attorney’s advising of a constituent public agency does 
not give rise to an attorney-client relationship separate and distinct from the attorney’s relationship to 
the overall governmental entity of which the agency is a part.”). 
 101. Id. The court further states that 
an exception must be recognized when the agency lawfully functions independently of the 
overall entity. Where an attorney advises or represents a public agency with respect to a 
matter as to which the agency possesses independent authority, such that a dispute over the 
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court found that the civil service commission had independent authority 
because when the county opposed a commission decision, the county had 
to take the commission to court rather than simply overrule it.102 Since the 
county counsel had given legal advice to a commission with independent 
authority, the commission itself was a distinct client of the county 
counsel.103 
In another conflicts of interest case, employees of the Rhode Island 
Department of Children, Youth and Families sued the department for 
alleged civil rights violations.104 The employees’ lawyer also did legal 
work for two Rhode Island state boards, and the state’s attorney general 
argued that representation of the employees constituted an improper 
conflict of interest. The issue was whether the lawyer represented just the 
two specific state boards, or instead represented the entire state 
government. The court noted that governmental agencies sometimes 
oppose each other in litigation, and thus the agency, rather than the 
government as a whole, is the client.105 It examined Rhode Island’s 
restrictions on its employees and found that state employees are prohibited 
from serving as lawyers for a party suing the particular agency where they 
are employed.106 By contrast, federal law prohibits executive branch 
employees from serving as lawyers for a party suing the executive 
branch.107 Thus, the court found that the clients of this lawyer were the 
particular boards he represented, rather than the entire state government.  
While this kind of structural analysis is the most satisfying way to 
identify a government lawyer’s client, not all courts that have decided the 
issue of client identity use the structural approach. In a case involving the 
possible disqualification of a private law firm that arguably represented the 
 
 
matter may result in litigation between the agency and the overall entity, a distinct attorney-
client relationship with the agency is created. 
Id. 
 102. Id. The court states: 
Here, . . . the conflict between the Department of Social Services and the Commission cannot 
be resolved in the usual manner because the County Charter gives the Commission authority 
independent of the County’s normal hierarchical structure. The Board of Supervisors has been 
forced to sue the Commission in an attempt to overturn its rulings. 
Id. 
 103. Id. at 164, 167 (disqualifying county counsel from representing county in litigation against 
commission). For further discussion of this case, see Solomon, supra note 10, at 274–75. 
 104. Gray v. R.I. Dep’t of Children, Youth and Families, 937 F. Supp. 153 (D.R.I. 1996). 
 105. Id. at 160 (noting that government agencies’ “interests are quite often conflicting or 
divergent”).  
 106. See id. at 156–58 (applying the Rhode Island Code of Ethics (1990) and citing R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 36-14-5(e)(2)). 
 107. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 205(a)(2) (2000)). 
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State of New York but was now representing a tobacco company being 
sued by the state, the court concluded that the firm represented only 
specific agencies rather than the state as a whole, analogizing in a rather 
strained fashion to the situation of a firm that represents an association’s 
members but not the entire association.108 In a case involving a county’s 
claim of attorney-client privilege for communications between the county 
attorney and a county employee, where those communications had also 
been shared with “the county personnel office, the county auditor’s office, 
and the county judge’s office,” a Texas state court found that those other 
offices constituted third parties outside the lawyer-client relationship, thus 
waiving the attorney-client privilege.109 But the court failed to consider 
whether those offices were all part of the county attorney’s client.110  
The identity of the client is determined by examining the structure of 
authority within the government. Applying this structural analysis to the 
federal government’s executive branch, client identity depends on one’s 
theory about the structure of executive-branch authority. Proponents of the 
unitary-executive view have asserted that all executive-branch lawyers 
have as their client the entire executive branch, with the President 
ultimately responsible for defining client interests.111 But this unitary-
executive view is not universally held. Some commentators note that 
individual departments have some independent authority based on 
congressional enactments, even though the President can put political 
pressure on a department secretary, or even fire the secretary.112 These 
commentators would likely conclude that the client of a department lawyer 
is the department itself rather than the entire executive branch.113 For 
 
 
 108. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Pataki, 152 F. Supp. 2d 276, 282–89 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001) (refusing to disqualify the law firm from representing a tobacco company being sued by the 
state). See discussion of this case in Patricia E. Salkin, Beware: What You Say to Your [Government] 
Lawyer May Be Held Against You—The Erosion of Government Attorney-Client Confidentiality, 35 
URB. LAW. 283, 292 (2003). 
 109. Cameron County v. Hinojosa, 760 S.W.2d 742, 745–46 (Tex. App. 1988). 
 110. See id. Compare the Texas court’s approach in Hinojosa, 760 S.W.2d at 746, with the 
California court’s approach in Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 159, 163–67 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1985). 
 111. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 10, at 1298 (asserting that “the [executive branch] attorney’s 
obligation is most reasonably seen as running to the executive branch as a whole and to the President 
as its head”); Paulsen, supra note 11, at 487 (“[A]s a matter of the constitutive law of the legal entity 
in question . . . an attorney working for an agency within the executive branch represents . . . the 
executive branch.”). 
 112. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative 
Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (2007). 
 113. But cf. Lawry, Wrong Question, supra note 10, at 67. Lawry states: 
[C]alling the agency the “client” only confuses . . . sound policy, for it is never the case that 
the matter cannot be pursued by the individual lawyer at least to the Attorney General or 
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many of the lawyers employed by independent agencies, such as the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or the Federal 
Communications Commission, their client is the agency itself.114 Such an 
agency is even more insulated from presidential control and thus can take 
positions that will dissatisfy the President. An SEC lawyer who disagrees 
with an agency decision can appeal that decision up to the Commission 
itself, but not beyond the Commission. A Justice Department lawyer who 
is defending a lawsuit against the Agriculture Department may in common 
parlance refer to that department as her client. But by statute the Justice 
Department controls the litigation and is concerned with the effect of any 
rulings on the rest of the executive branch.115 Even if the Secretary of 
Agriculture would prefer a particular position, the Attorney General can 
overrule that position if he deems it in the interest of the executive branch. 
So it would be more accurate to say that the client of the Justice 
Department lawyer is the entire executive branch.116 Federal prosecutors 
have as their clients the executive branch, and they have significant 
independence in how they go about their duties.117  
Most congressional lawyers have as their clients individual legislators, 
while a few represent entities within the legislative branch.118 The former 
work either on the personal office staff or the committee staff of a 
particular member of the House of Representatives or Senate. They owe 
duties of loyalty and confidentiality to the individual legislator. Similarly, 
 
 
Justice Department level. If the lawyer is working in the Executive Branch, the process may 
not stop until it reaches the President himself. 
Id.  
 114. In a few cases, lawyers work for individual commissioners rather than the commission as a 
whole. In those cases, the client is the individual commissioner in his official capacity. 
 115. 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2000) (“[T]he conduct of litigation in which the United States, an agency, 
or officer thereof is a party, or is interested, and securing evidence therefor, is reserved to officers of 
the Department of Justice . . . .”). 
 116. By contrast, the D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct assert that “[t]he client of the 
government lawyer is the agency that employs the lawyer unless expressly provided to the contrary by 
appropriate law, regulation, or order.” D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(k) (2007). This would 
make the Justice Department lawyer’s client the Justice Department. 
 117. See infra Part I.C (discussing lawyers with client-like authority to make decisions). Under the 
former Independent Counsel statute, Independent Counsels had the same authority as the U.S. 
Attorney General. 28 U.S.C. § 594(a) (2000). The statute provides that  
an independent counsel appointed . . . shall have, with respect to all matters in such 
independent counsel’s prosecutorial jurisdiction . . . full power and independent authority to 
exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions and powers of the Department of Justice, 
the Attorney General, and any other officer or employee of the Department of Justice . . . . 
Id. 
 118. Kathleen Clark, The Ethics of Representing Elected Representatives, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Spring 1998, at 31, 36–37. 
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lawyers in the Office of the Legislative Counsel have transitory lawyer-
client relationships with the individual legislators to whom they give legal 
advice on the drafting of legislation.119 By contrast, there are a few 
lawyers on Capitol Hill whose clients are legislative entities rather than 
individual legislators. For example, the Senate Legal Counsel represents 
the Senate as an institution, regularly defending the Senate in lawsuits and 
pursuing subpoena enforcement actions in connection with Senate 
Committee investigations.120  
In the judicial branch, although judges are lawyers, they do not act in a 
representative capacity and therefore do not have any clients. Judicial 
clerks give legal advice to the judges for whom they work, so one might 
classify the judge as the clerk’s client. But many judicial clerks are not yet 
licensed as lawyers when they begin their clerkships. So it is unclear that 
judicial clerks are lawyers at all, let alone whether their judges are their 
clients.121 For example, Edward Lazarus clerked for Justice Blackmun 
during the 1988–89 Term and ten years later published a book that 
critiqued the Supreme Court’s handling of certain highly charged cases.122 
Lazarus’s book was met with a chorus of criticism.123 Lazarus was accused 
of violating the confidentiality inherent in the clerk-Justice relationship 
and of violating the confidentiality provision in the Supreme Court’s rules 
for clerks.124 But there was little discussion of whether he violated the 
confidentiality rule for lawyers.125  
With regard to local governments, normally the client is the local 
government itself rather than the local officials who run the government.126 
 
 
 119. See MATTHEW ERIC GLASSMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE 
COUNSEL: SENATE (2007), available at http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/RS20856.pdf. 
These lawyers are required “to maintain the attorney-client relationship with respect to any 
communications with Senators or staff.” Id. at 2. 
 120. Charles Tiefer, The Senate and House Counsel Offices: Dilemmas of Representing in Court 
the Institutional Congressional Client, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1998, at 47, 56–62. 
 121. Cf. Comment, The Law Clerk’s Duty of Confidentiality, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1230, 1247 
(1981) (asserting that a clerk’s putative client would be the court rather than the individual judge, 
based on Prof’l Ethics Comm., Fed. Bar Ass’n, Op. 73-1 (1973) (identifying a government lawyer’s 
client as the employing agency)). 
 122. See EDWARD P. LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE FIRST EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE 
EPIC STRUGGLES INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT (1998). 
 123. See, e.g., Richard W. Painter, A Law Clerk Betrays the Supreme Court, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 
1998, at A23; Gretchen Craft Rubin, Betraying a Trust, WASH. POST, June 17, 1998, at A27. 
 124. See, e.g., Alex Kozinski, Conduct Unbecoming, 108 YALE L.J. 835, 843–46 (1999); Richard 
W. Painter, Open Chambers?, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1430, 1435 (1999). 
 125. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Opening Closed Chambers, 108 YALE L.J. 1087, 1100 (1999) 
(“[T]he attorney-client relationship is not analogous to the clerk-Justice relationship.”).  
 126. Ross v. City of Memphis, 423 F.3d 596, 605 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[G]enerally in conversations 
between municipal officials and the municipality’s counsel, the municipality, not any individual 
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One would need to look closely at the structure of the particular local 
government to determine whether the client is the entire local government, 
the local legislature, the local government’s executive branch, or some 
other subset of the government.  
C. Some Government Lawyers Have Authority to Make Decisions That 
Are Normally in the Hands of the Client 
The previous section showed how complicated it can be to determine 
the identity of a particular government lawyer’s client. This section 
addresses two related issues: the fact that the lawyer-client relationship in 
government is sometimes—but not always—fundamentally different from 
the lawyer-client relationship in the private sector and the fact that some 
government lawyers may, and indeed should, consider the public interest 
in making decisions about the representation.127 
1. “Runaway” Lawyers128 
Some government lawyers have a traditional lawyer-client relationship 
with their government client. The client decides on the objectives of the 
representation and the lawyer pursues those objectives.129 Other 
government lawyers serve both as the lawyer and essentially as a trustee, 
entrusted to make decisions that clients normally make.130 The 
professional rules require a lawyer to abide by a client’s decision on 
whether to settle a case or whether to appeal an adverse decision.131 Yet 
some government lawyers routinely decide whether to litigate or settle 
 
 
officers, is the client.”). 
 127. See Humphrey v. McLaren, 402 N.W.2d 535, 543 (Minn. 1987) (“[I]n the public attorney-
public client relationship, there is a quality of disinterested interest not usually found in the private 
sector.”). 
 128. Compare a discussion of “runaway” grand juries in Roger Roots, If It’s Not a Runaway, It’s 
Not a Real Grand Jury, 33 CREIGHTON L. REV. 821 (2000). 
 129. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2007) (“[A] lawyer shall abide by a client’s 
decisions concerning the objectives of representation and . . . shall consult with the client as to the 
means by which they are to be pursued.”). 
 130. For an example of a state rejecting this type of trustee-like power for an attorney general, see 
State ex rel. Amerland v. Hagan, 175 N.W. 372, 374 (N.D. 1919) (“[T]he Attorney General . . . [does 
not] step[] into the shoes of such client in wholly directing the defense and the legal steps to be taken 
in opposition or contrary to the wishes and demands of his client or the officer or department 
concerned.”), overruled on other grounds by Benson v. N.D. Workmen’s Comp. Bureau, 283 N.W.2d 
96, 107 (N.D. 1979). 
 131. Model Rule 1.2(a) states: “A lawyer shall abide by a client’s decision whether to settle a 
matter.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2007). 
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cases on behalf of their clients.132 Prosecutors decide themselves whether 
to seek indictments and whether to allow plea agreements and cannot 
allow other officials in the government to make these decisions.133 In 
addition, many state attorneys general have this client-like authority in 
civil cases. For example, in a case where the South Carolina Attorney 
General was representing the state tax commission, the Attorney General 
was permitted to settle a tax dispute even though two of the three members 
of the commission objected to the settlement.134 In Massachusetts, after the 
Attorney General unsuccessfully defended the civil service commission in 
a sex discrimination lawsuit, the commission voted not to appeal the 
decision. But the Attorney General took the appeal anyway against the 
wishes of his client.135 The Massachusetts Supreme Court found that the 
Attorney General’s “relationship with the State officers he represents . . . 
is not constrained by the parameters of the traditional attorney-client 
relationship.”136 In another case, the Massachusetts Attorney General 
refused to appeal an adverse judgment even though the state officer being 
sued wanted to appeal.137  
At the federal level, Congress has set out by statute that the Department 
of Justice controls most litigation decisions.138 Justice Department lawyers 
represent executive-branch agencies in court, but it is the Justice 
Department—not the agencies—that decides whether to bring litigation 
 
 
 132. Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 
MICH. L. REV. 676, 709 (2005) (noting that the U.S. Solicitor General files petitions for certiorari in 
“less than ten to twenty percent” of cases in which federal agencies and department want Supreme 
Court review of lower court decisions and “turns down . . . the overwhelming majority of [agency] 
requests for authorization to seek rehearing en banc” and “two to three times per year” confesses error, 
“abandoning the government’s victory in a lower court . . . [i]f [his] own analysis disagrees with the 
judgment of the lower court that sustained the government’s position”). In some cases where the 
government has confessed error, the court has appointed amicus curiae to argue in favor of the 
judgment below. See id. at 719 n.130. 
 133. Nancy V. Baker, The Attorney General as a Legal Policy-Maker: Conflicting Loyalties, in 
GOVERNMENT LAWYERS: THE FEDERAL LEGAL BUREAUCRACY AND PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS 44 
(Cornell W. Clayton ed., 1995). After a Dallas policeman received a light sentence from a state court 
jury for killing a 12-year-old Hispanic boy, President Carter wanted his Justice Department to bring a 
federal civil rights prosecution against the policeman. Attorney General Griffin Bell refused and told 
the President, “You can’t tell me who to prosecute. You delegated the prosecutorial discretion to me. I 
have to exercise it. But you can get rid of me.” Id. See also Green, supra note 67, at 238 (“Unlike most 
other lawyers, prosecutors cannot look to a client, or the client’s representative, to decide how to carry 
out this objective [to seek justice].”). 
 134. Cooley v. S.C. Tax Comm’n, 28 S.E.2d 445, 449–511 (S.C. 1943). 
 135. Feeney v. Commonwealth, 366 N.E.2d 1262, 1264, 1266–67 (Mass. 1977). 
 136. Id. at 1266. 
 137. Sec’y of Admin. & Finance v. Att’y Gen., 326 N.E.2d 334, 336 (Mass. 1975) (rejecting the 
secretary’s argument that he had a traditional attorney-client relationship with the attorney general, 
which would allow the secretary to decide whether to appeal). 
 138. 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2000). 
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and whether to settle it.139 The Solicitor General “is not bound by the 
views of his ‘clients.’ He may confess error when he believes they are in 
error. . . . He may refuse to approve their requests to petition the Court for 
writs of certiorari.”140  
As part of the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995, Congress 
made itself subject to employment discrimination laws and set up a 
mechanism allowing congressional employees to seek redress despite the 
Constitution’s Speech or Debate Clause immunity.141 When a Senate 
employee alleges discrimination, he can file suit against the office where 
he was employed (rather than against the particular senator or the Senate 
itself). The Senate Chief Counsel for Employment represents the 
defendant office, and any monetary judgment is paid out of general Senate 
coffers rather than a particular senator’s allotment.142 Under this 
arrangement, Senate employees can obtain compensation for wrongful 
discrimination, but individual senators are not subject to liability. The 
Senate as an institution has determined that it has an interest in assuring 
that its employees are able to seek compensation for discrimination, while 
individual Senate offices presumably have an interest in avoiding any 
finding of wrongful discrimination. The Senate Chief Counsel for 
Employment apparently takes direction from the particular offices that she 
represents and has vigorously defended offices accused of discrimination, 
repeatedly arguing for broad immunity under the Constitution’s Speech or 
Debate Clause.143 This situation finally came to a head in a discrimination 
case when the senator whose office the plaintiff was suing retired before 
 
 
 139. Harvey, supra note 70, at 1573. The division of responsibility between the Justice 
Department lawyer and the “client” agency deserves a closer empirical look. See Wald, supra note 69, 
at 118 (describing a court-initiated mediation program under which the mediator can “request that 
agency representatives attend the mediation sessions if it appeared that it was the lawyer—and not the 
agency—who was resistant to settlement and to communicate offers directly to those representatives 
(with prior notice to government counsel)”). 
 140. Role of the Solicitor General, 1 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 228, 230 (1977). It is significant that 
this opinion puts “clients” within quotation marks. See id. The opinion appears to be referring to 
individual agencies’ officeholders who have preferences regarding particular legal disputes. It is more 
accurate to assert that the Solicitor General’s client is the entire executive branch, and that these 
individual agencies or officeholders may have parochial interests that must be subjugated to the more 
wide-ranging interests of the executive branch, both laterally across the branch and across time. See 
Pillard, supra note 132, at 729 (noting that “the SG considers the impact of any given litigation 
position both across the government as a whole and over time”). 
 141. Congressional Accountability Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-1, 109 Stat. 3 (codified as 
amended at 2 U.S.C. § 1301 et. seq. (2000)). 
 142. 2 U.S.C. § 1415(a) (2000). 
 143. John Bresnahan, Supreme Court Case Pits Senate Lawyer Against Senate Lawyer, POLITICO, 
Apr. 2, 2007, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0407/3392.html. 
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the case had been adjudicated.144 The Senate Chief Counsel for 
Employment argued for broad speech or debate immunity,145 while the 
Senate itself filed an amicus brief disclaiming immunity applied in the 
case.146 Perhaps even more remarkable, the Senate Chief Counsel for 
Employment argued that her client, the Office of Senator Dayton, no 
longer existed and that the case was moot because the senator’s term had 
expired and he had not sought a new term.147 But if her client no longer 
existed, one wonders from whom she was taking direction in the case. 
Congress needs to clarify whether the Senate itself—rather than a 
particular senator whose office is being sued—controls the defense of 
these lawsuits, just as the Senate itself is ultimately responsible for any 
monetary judgment.148 Under the current arrangement, the Senate Chief 
Counsel for Employment appears to be untethered to any client and has 
made arguments that undermine the institutional interests of the Senate.149 
At the state level, the situations vary considerably. Many states allocate 
to a state attorney general decisions on whether to bring and settle 
lawsuits.150 The Illinois Attorney General, for example, has the authority 
to “direct the legal affairs of the State and its agencies.”151 In such a 
situation, the relationship between the state attorney general and the 
agency is not “precisely akin” to that between a private sector lawyer and 
client.152 Because the lawyer-client relationship is different, the state 
 
 
 144. Office of Sen. Mark Dayton v. Hanson, 127 S. Ct. 2018 (2007). 
 145. Brief for Appellant at 23–47, Office of Sen. Mark Dayton v. Hanson, 127 S. Ct. 2018 (2007) 
(No. 06-618), 2007 WL 621862, available at http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/06-
07/06-618_Petitioner.pdf. 
 146. Brief for the United States Senate as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellee at 19–30, Office of 
Sen. Mark Dayton v. Hanson, 127 S. Ct. 2018 (2007) (No. 06-618), 2007 WL 1022679. 
 147. Brief for Appellant, supra note 145, at 16–22. 
 148. Brief for the United States Senate as Amicus Curiae Supporting the Appellee, supra note 
146, at 17 (noting that “[t]he employing office is nothing more than an administrative unit of the 
Senate; it is the Senate that provides the resources for the vigorous defense of suits and for the 
payment of judgments” (footnote omitted)). 
 149. Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Office of Sen. Mark Dayton v. Hanson, 127 S. Ct. 2018 
(2007) (No. 06-618), 2007 WL 1198567 (Senate Chief Counsel for Employment arguing that the 
Supreme Court does not defer to Congress’s own interpretation of the speech and debate clause 
because “Congress of course is a political body . . . that . . . will make decisions that are politically 
expedient . . . , which means that over time their decisions can change”). 
 150. William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General, and 
Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2455–61 (2006); Davids, supra note 69, at 
371–73, 399–400. 
 151. EPA v. Pollution Control Bd., 372 N.E.2d 50, 53 (Ill. 1977). 
 152. Id. at 52–53 (“[A]lthough an attorney-client relationship exists between a State agency and 
the Attorney General, it cannot be said that the role of the Attorney General apropos of a State agency 
is precisely akin to the traditional role of private counsel apropos of a client.”); see also Conn. 
Comm’n on Special Revenue v. Conn. Freedom of Info. Comm’n, 387 A.2d. 533, 537–38 (Conn. 
1978). 
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attorney general is permitted to do things that conflict-of-interest standards 
would normally prohibit. Thus, a state attorney general’s office has been 
permitted to represent opposing parties in a lawsuit—two separate state 
commissions that disagreed about application of state law.153 State 
attorneys general routinely file lawsuits against state agencies and officials 
that they normally represent.154  
In other states, attorneys general have a more traditional lawyer-client 
relationship with client agencies.155 The agencies make legal policy 
 
 
 153. See, e.g., Conn. Comm’n, 387 A.2d. at 537 (finding that the state attorney general was not 
“guilty of any professional impropriety” when his office represented both plaintiff and defendant in a 
lawsuit); Pollution Control Bd., 372 N.E.2d at 53 (“[T]he Attorney General may represent opposing 
State agencies in a dispute” when the Attorney General is not an actual party to the dispute); see also 
Scott v. Cadagin, 358 N.E.2d 1125, 1128–29 (Ill. 1976) (permitting attorney general to withdraw from 
representation of state commission and represent government department that was intervening and 
opposing commission); State ex rel. Allain v Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 418 So. 2d 779, 782, 784 
(Miss. 1982) (permitting attorney general to intervene in lawsuit and challenge rate increase approved 
by public service commission, even though a member of his office represented commission and 
acknowledging that attorney general “will be confronted with many instances where he must, through 
his office, furnish legal counsel to two or more agencies with conflicting interest or views”). 
 154. See, e.g., People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221, 1129–31 (Colo. 2003) (attorney 
general can sue secretary of state regarding constitutionality of congressional redistricting); People ex 
rel. Scott v. Ill. Racing Bd., 301 N.E.2d 285, 288–89 (Ill. 1973) (attorney general could sue Racing 
Board seeking review of its decision to grant licenses); Commonwealth ex rel. Hancock v. Paxton, 516 
S.W.2d 865, 868 (Ky. Ct. App. 1974) (attorney general’s “constitutional, statutory and common law 
powers include the power to initiate a suit” against a state agency challenging the constitutionality of a 
statute); Superintendent Of Ins. v. Att’y Gen., 558 A.2d 1197, 1204 (Me. 1989) (“[W]hen the Attorney 
General disagrees with a state agency, he is not disqualified from participating in a suit affecting the 
public interest merely because members of his staff had previously provided representation to the 
agency at the administrative stage of the proceedings.”); State ex rel. Olsen v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 283 
P.2d 594, 600 (Mont. 1955) (attorney general can sue public service commission challenging its 
approval of a telephone rate hike, even though he “is the attorney for the commission”). But see People 
ex rel. Deukmejian v. Brown, 624 P.2d 1206, 1207–11 (Cal. 1981) (attorney general cannot sue State 
Personnel Board where lawyers in his office had previously advised Board on same issue); Reiter v. 
Wallgreen, 184 P.2d 571, 575 (Wash. 1947). The Reiter court stated: 
[The Attorney General’s] paramount duty is . . . the protection of the interest of the people of 
the state, and, where he is cognizant of violations of the Constitution or the statutes by a state 
officer, his duty is to obstruct and not to assist, and, where the interests of the public are 
antagonistic to those of state officers, or where state officers may conflict among themselves, 
it is impossible and improper for the Attorney General to defend such state officers. 
Id. (quoting State ex rel. Dunbar v. State Bd. of Equalization, 249 P. 996, 999 (Wash. 1926)). 
 155. See Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. McGraw, 461 S.E.2d 850, 862 (W. Va. 1995) (citing 
Manchin v. Browning, 296 S.E.2d 909, 920 (W. Va. 1982)) (“[T]here [is] a traditional attorney-client 
relationship between the Attorney General and the state officer he represents.”); State ex rel. Caryl v. 
MacQueen, 385 S.E.2d 646, 649 (W. Va. 1989) (“[T]he relationship between the Attorney General and 
the Tax Commissioner is clearly one of an attorney to his client and shall be treated as such by the 
Attorney General with regard to the confidentiality of the information.” (footnote call number 
omitted)); Manchin v. Browning, 296 S.E.2d 909, 920 (W. Va. 1982) (“The Legislature has thus 
created a traditional attorney-client relationship between the Attorney General and the state officers he 
is required to represent.”); see also Deukmejian, 624 P.2d at 1207–11. 
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decisions and the attorney general defends those decisions in court.156 
These government lawyers must defer to their clients’ decisions, even 
when the lawyers believe that the clients are acting against the public 
interest.157 For example, in a Texas case, the Attorney General asked a 
court to overturn a state agency’s water regulation because of alleged 
violations of equal protection.158 The court ruled that the Attorney General 
could not sue a state agency.159  
Occasionally, government lawyers who do not have this trustee-like 
power will nonetheless make decisions as though they did have the power. 
The results can be rather strange. For example, in a 1997 case involving a 
voter initiative, the “Legal Division” of the California Fair Political 
Practices Commission filed an amicus brief in a case on behalf of the 
Legal Division itself, even though the Commission had not taken a 
position on the case.160 When a lawyer is not tethered to a client, the 
lawyer may make arguments with which the client would disagree.161 The 
West Virginia Attorney General was called upon to defend the Secretary 
of State in a federal case challenging the state’s apportionment plan for 
 
 
 156. See, e.g., McGraw, 461 S.E.2d at 862 (“[T]he role of the Attorney General ‘is not to make 
public policy in his own right on behalf of the state[,]’ but rather ‘to exercise his skill as the state’s 
chief lawyer to zealously advocate and defend the policy position of the officer or agency in the 
litigation’ . . . .” (quoting Manchin, 296 S.E.2d at 920)); see also York v. Penn. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 
295 A.2d 825, 832 (Pa. 1972) (prohibiting attorney general from arguing against decision made by 
state agency and stating that “boards and commissions are given authority to make decisions which 
involve . . . conclusions of law. . . . The legislature provided for the review of these decisions by courts 
. . . . Appeals from these decisions are not to the attorney general.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 157. Deukmejian, 624 P.2d at 1209 (rejecting the attorney general’s contention that he “may 
determine, contrary to the views of the Governor, wherein lies the public interest”); Motor Club of 
Iowa v. Dep’t of Transp., 251 N.W.2d 510, 514 (Iowa 1977) (attorney general’s role is “to defend the 
department, not to assert his vision of state interest”); see Solomon, supra note 10, at 323 (extensively 
discussing Deukmejian, 624 P.2d 1206); see also Miller, supra note 10, at 54 (arguing against 
consideration of public interest). But cf. Davids, supra note 69, at 373–74 (asserting that some lawyers 
have as a client the public interest). 
 158. Hill v. Tex. Water Quality Bd., 568 S.W.2d 738, 739 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978). The court ruled 
that a state statute required the attorney general to represent the agency and to supervise any lawyer 
working for the agency. Thus, allowing the attorney general to sue the agency “would put him on both 
sides of the lawsuit.” Id. at 741. This and other cases concerning the Texas Attorney General’s 
authority are discussed extensively in Bill Aleshire, Note, The Texas Attorney General: Attorney or 
General?, 20 REV. LITIG. 187 (2000). 
 159. Tex. Water Quality Bd., 568 S.W.2d at 741. But see Davids, supra note 69, at 401 (criticizing 
courts that prioritize application of the ethics rules to state attorneys general rather than focusing on 
the attorney generals’ roles within state governments). 
 160. Yes on Measure A v. City of Lake Forest, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 517, 518 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) 
(noting that the brief of the Fair Political Practices Commission states that the “‘position taken in this 
brief is that of the General Counsel and the Legal Division of the agency’” and that the issue “‘ha[d] 
not been presented to the Commission for a formal discussion and vote’”). 
 161. United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693 (1988) (special prosecutor did not 
have authority to seek certiorari against wishes of Solicitor General). 
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congressional districts.162 But rather than pursuing the wishes of the 
Secretary of State and conceding the unconstitutionality of the plan, the 
Attorney General sought to defend the apportionment plan. So, the 
Secretary of State obtained a mandamus from the state’s supreme court, 
directing the Attorney General to pursue the Secretary of State’s objectives 
in the apportionment litigation.163 
2. Basing Decisions on the Public Interest 
Although one finds some support for consideration of the public 
interest, most commentators have criticized this approach. Geoffrey 
Miller, in particular, wrote a convincing critique of government lawyers’ 
considering the public interest, pointing out that this approach would lead 
to chaos since different lawyers have different conceptions of the public 
interest.164 This is a valuable insight, but it is limited in its application. For 
there is a set of government lawyers who should consider the public 
interest: those who can make client-like decisions. 
Government lawyers who have this client-like decision-making 
authority essentially serve as trustees for the client.165 When making those 
client-like decisions in their role as trustees, it is appropriate for 
government lawyers to consider the public interest.166 For example, the 
California Attorney General has the authority to bring lawsuits on behalf 
of the State and has a “paramount duty to represent and protect the public 
interest.”167 
 
 
 162. Manchin v. Browning, 296 S.E.2d 909, 912–13 (W. Va. 1982). The West Virginia Supreme 
Court acknowledged that when the attorney general pursues litigation in his own name (rather than on 
behalf of a particular state official), he is free to pursue the public interest as he sees it. Id. at 918. 
 163. Id. at 912–13, 923. 
 164. Miller, supra note 10, at 1294–95. Bruce Green has characterized the “public interest” 
approach this way: “In this conception, . . . as a practical matter, the lawyer has no client and is not in 
an attorney-client relationship. . . . [T]he lawyer essentially has a roving commission to do what, in the 
exercise of professional judgment, seems best to serve the public.” Green, supra note 67, at 267–68. 
 165. Former Attorney General Francis Biddle asserted that the Solicitor General “stands in his 
client’s shoes,” and that “the client has no say in the matter.” FRANCIS BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 
97 (1962), quoted in Role of the Solicitor General, 1 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 228, 230 (1977).  
 166. In re Witness Before Special Grand Jury 2000–2, 288 F.3d 289, 294 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Public 
officials . . . exercise the power of the state . . . [and have] the responsibility to act in the public 
interest.”); Conn. Comm’n on Special Revenue v. Conn. Freedom of Info. Comm’n, 387 A.2d. 533, 
538 (Conn. 1978); EPA v. Pollution Control Bd., 372 N.E.2d 50, 53 (Ill. 1977) (noting that the state 
attorney general represents not only “the particular interests of State agencies,” but also “the broader 
interests of the State”); Humphrey v. McLaren, 402 N.W.2d 535, 543 (Minn. 1987) (“[A] government 
litigator must take positions with the common public good in mind, unlike the private practitioner who 
seeks vindication of a particular result for a particular client.”).  
 167. D’Amico v. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 11 Cal. 3d 1, 16, (Cal. 1974) (rejecting idea that the public 
interest is unrepresented when state attorney general makes concession in litigation). 
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While some have asserted that, for these lawyers, the “public interest” 
is their client, it makes more sense to conceive of these lawyers as trustees 
of the client (such as the state government) who can consider the public 
interest in making their decisions. So, it is not that the public interest is the 
client, but rather the state is the client, and the state attorney general is 
entrusted to make decisions about what is in the best interest of the State, 
and then to implement those decisions through her legal work.168 The 
attorney general is both the lawyer and the trustee of the client. The 
attorney general has the power as trustee to make the determination of 
what is in the interest of the State.  
If a government lawyer has the authority to make client-like decisions 
(such as whether to bring or settle cases), then she also has the 
responsibility to act not just like any client, but in a way this particular 
client—a sovereign—should act. In our legal tradition, the sovereign is not 
free to act in the same way as any private litigant but is expected to act 
fairly and impartially.169 This obligation of fairness is seen most 
prominently in criminal prosecutions. As the United States Supreme Court 
declared in Berger v. United States, 
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary 
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to 
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; 
and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it 
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.170 
This requirement that government lawyers be fair is reflected in 
prosecutors’ obligations to provide criminal defendants with information 
that can help the defense, a deviation from the normal adversary 
process.171 This obligation to act fairly is so central to the government 
 
 
 168. For a rather prescient prediction of how the role of a state attorney general would expand to 
include protection of the public interest, see William J. Baxley, The State’s Attorney, 25 ALA. L. REV. 
19, 21 (1972) (predicting that the state attorney general “in the year 2000 will find himself more the 
‘people’s lawyer’ than the state’s lawyer . . . . He will be somewhat of an ‘ombudsman’—a person 
who is a buffer between the citizen and his government and whose ultimate allegiance is to the people-
at-large.”). 
 169. Robert Flannigan, The Fiduciary Obligation, 9 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 285, 311–13 (1989).  
 170. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
 171. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87–88 (1963). Model Rule 3.8(d) requires prosecutors to 
make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor 
that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with 
sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information 
known to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a 
protective order of the tribunal. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 1033 Clark book pages.doc  5/20/2008 11:28:00 AM  
 
 
 
 
 
1070 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 85:1033 
 
 
 
 
lawyer’s mission that the Justice Department building has this quotation 
inscribed near the entrance to the Attorney General’s office: “The United 
States wins its point whenever justice is done its citizens in the courts.”172 
As the Supreme Court explained in Berger, the obligation to do justice 
is based on the government’s obligation as a sovereign “to govern 
impartially.”173 As such, the obligation to govern impartially and do justice 
would seem to apply with equal force to the government’s civil 
litigation.174 One finds strong support for this principle in civil 
condemnation cases, where courts have found that government lawyers 
have an obligation to develop a full and fair record to arrive at just 
compensation, not just to minimize the financial payout by the 
government.175 Judge Jack Weinstein has explained that when he was a 
county attorney handling a condemnation action against an 
unsophisticated elderly couple, he rejected a proposed settlement because 
it did not adequately compensate the couple for their valuable land.176  
 
 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2007). Some scholars have argued that prosecutors can 
best seek justice by scrupulously following the specific procedures required of them rather than by 
attempting to implement a more inchoate notion of “justice” in particular cases. Fred C. Zacharias & 
Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors, 88 GEO. L.J. 207 (2000). 
 172. This quotation from former Solicitor General Lehmann is inscribed in the Rotunda of the 
Justice Department building. See Janet Reno, Indigent Defense: Legal Service for Poor Needs 
Vigilance, CHAMPION, May 1998, at 32, available at http://www.nacdl.org/CHAMPION/ARTICLES/ 
98may05.htm; see also Pillard, supra note 132, at 723 (identifying the quote’s author as former 
Solicitor General Frederick W. Lehmann). 
 173. Berger, 295 U.S. at 88. 
 174. See Green, supra note 67, at 277 (persuasively arguing that government civil litigators—
particularly those who “act as surrogate[s] of the client”—should seek justice); see also People ex rel. 
Clancy v. Superior Court, 705 P.2d 347, 350–53 (Cal. 1985) (disqualifying lawyer hired by a city to 
handle abatement action on contingent fee basis). In Clancy, the California Supreme Court declared 
that a prosecutor  
is a representative of the sovereign; he must act with the impartiality required of those who 
govern. . . . [This duty is] not limited to criminal prosecutors: A government lawyer in a civil 
action or administrative proceeding has the responsibility to seek justice and to develop a full 
and fair record . . . . 
Id. at 350 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 175. City of Los Angeles v. Decker, 558 P.2d 545, 551 (Cal. 1977) (holding that the duty of a 
government attorney in an eminent domain action includes developing full and fair record to arrive at 
just compensation and reversing compensation award because city attorney withheld from jury 
information about land’s commercial use and its value); see also MODEL CODE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY EC 7–14 (1980) (“A government lawyer in a civil action . . . has the responsibility to 
seek justice and to develop a full and fair record . . . .”). 
 176. Jack B. Weinstein, Some Ethical and Political Problems of a Government Attorney, 18 ME. 
L. REV. 155 (1966) (describing his rejection of a proposed settlement compensating unrepresented 
elderly couple with consideration worth only a third of assessor’s valuation of land and paying couple 
more than they requested); Weinstein & Crosthwait, supra note 69, at 6–7 (same). 
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Aside from civil condemnation cases, one finds only a few cases 
supporting the obligation to be fair.177 One academic commentator, Steven 
Berenson, has looked at these few civil cases and concluded that 
government civil litigators “should be much more concerned with pursuit 
of the public interest than their counterparts who represent private 
clients.”178 But in each of the identified cases, the assertion that 
government civil litigators must do justice was merely dictum and had no 
impact on the outcome of the case. For example, in Freeport-McMoRan 
Oil & Gas Co. v. FERC, Judge Abner Mikva noted that while “[t]he 
Supreme Court was speaking of government prosecutors in Berger, . . . no 
one, to our knowledge (at least prior to oral argument), has suggested that 
the principle does not apply with equal force to the government’s civil 
lawyers.”179 But Mikva’s assertion had no impact on the outcome of this 
case, in which the court dismissed an appeal as moot. Instead, Judge 
Mikva was simply excoriating the FERC lawyer for pursuing an appeal 
after the case had clearly become moot and for “so unblushingly deny[ing] 
[at oral argument] that a government lawyer has obligations that might 
sometimes trump the desire to pound an opponent into submission.”180  
Most of the academic commentary on this issue rejects the notion that 
government lawyers should consider the public interest, concluding that it 
is too vague a standard for government lawyers to apply in specific 
situations.181 While government lawyers who have client-like decision-
making authority should consider the public interest, those who are acting 
 
 
 177. Freeport-McMoRan Oil & Gas Co. v. FERC, 962 F.2d 45, 47 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Douglas v. 
Donovan, 704 F.2d 1276, 1279–80 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, 716 F.2d 23, 33 
(D.C. Cir. 1983). Judge Abner Mikva wrote each of these decisions.  
 178. Berenson, Public Lawyers, supra note 88, at 794; see also Berenson, supra note 10. 
 179. Freeport-McMoRan Oil, 962 F.2d at 47.  
 180. Id. at 48. In Douglas v. Donovan, while the court wrote that “government attorneys . . . have 
special responsibilities to both this court and the public at large,” it admonished both the government 
and the private lawyer for failing to inform the court that the underlying dispute had been settled and 
therefore the case was moot. 704 F.2d 1276, 1279–80 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 In Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, while the court wrote that “[t]here is, indeed, much to suggest that 
government counsel have a higher duty to uphold because their client is not only the agency they 
represent but also the public at large,” it directed the district court to consider a form of written notice 
for entitlement to a hearing that the government had only recently submitted, even though it had “been 
circulating within the Department for many years.” 716 F.2d 23, 23 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 181. Miller, supra note 10, at 1294 (“[T]he notion that government attorneys represent some 
transcendental ‘public interest’ is, I believe, incoherent.”); see also William Josephson & Russell 
Pearce, To Whom Does the Government Lawyer Owe the Duty of Loyalty When Clients Are in 
Conflict?, 29 HOW. L.J. 539, 564 (1986) (“The government lawyer who uses the public interest 
approach . . . is not a lawyer representing a client but a lawyer representing herself.”); Lanctot, supra 
note 10, at 975 (criticizing the public interest approach as anti-democratic). 
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in more traditional lawyer roles vis-à-vis their government clients should 
defer to their clients’ decisions about what is in the public interest.  
One can find some support for the position that government lawyers 
should take into account the public interest when making decisions about 
whether to disclose information. For example, the Hawaii Rules of 
Professional Conduct specifically empower government lawyers to assess 
“the public good” in deciding whether to disclose information about 
government wrongdoing.182  
A more modest, alternative formulation of the public interest approach 
is that the public interest is embodied in a government’s duly enacted 
statutes, regulations, and rules. A government lawyer promotes the public 
interest by ensuring compliance with the law.183 This Article argues that 
those statutes and regulations that constitute the government’s 
information-control regime are the substantive standards that define a 
government lawyer’s confidentiality obligation.184  
Usually, the government structure makes it clear that there is an elected 
or appointed government official who has the authority to make decisions 
on behalf of the public. Unless the government lawyer has been delegated 
the authority to make such a determination, she should defer to the 
appropriate government officials and their determination of what is in the 
public interest and should take direction from them, rather than implement 
her own concept of what “the people” desire.185  
Returning to the factual scenario that began this Part, Ossias’s client 
would be the Department of Insurance, which has as its head an elected 
official, Charles Quackenbush. Even if Ossias believed that Quackenbush 
was violating the law, she was not permitted to disclose that information to 
anyone outside the client.186 Under California law, Ossias had the option 
 
 
 182. HAW. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c)(4)–(5) (2007).  
 183. Miller, supra note 10, at 1295. Miller writes: 
Although the public interest as a reified concept may not be ascertainable, the Constitution 
establishes procedures for approximating that ideal through election, appointment, 
confirmation, and legislation. Nothing systemic empowers government lawyers to substitute 
their individual conceptions of the good for the priorities and objectives established through 
these governmental processes. 
Id. Similarly, at least one Justice Department opinion has reduced the “do justice” command to 
requiring that a government lawyer act in accordance with the law. Role of the Solicitor General, 1 Op. 
Off. Legal Counsel 228, 232 (1977) (asserting that Solicitor General “must ‘do justice’—that is, he 
must discharge his office in accordance with law and ensure that improper concerns do not influence 
the presentation of the Government’s case in the Supreme Court”). 
 184. See infra Part III.  
 185. Miller, supra note 10, at 1298. 
 186. California Rule of Professional Conduct 3-600(B) states that if a lawyer 
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of raising the issue with Qackenbush personally,187 but there is no 
indication that she did so. The following Part develops an approach to 
government-lawyer confidentiality that would have specific application to 
a situation like the one Ossias faced: where a government lawyer comes 
across information about government wrongdoing.  
III. A GOVERNMENT LAWYER’S CONFIDENTIALITY OBLIGATION 
This Part examines two characteristics of governments that bear on the 
question of confidentiality. The first characteristic concerns the legitimacy 
of the government’s keeping secret its own wrongdoing. While the private 
sector may legitimately keep secret past wrongdoing, several sources—
including statutes, court decisions, and commentators—suggest that a 
government has no such right. This Part will explore the support for the 
proposition that, as a substantive matter, government lawyers may disclose 
government wrongdoing.  
The second characteristic concerns the way that the government 
controls its information. Private sector clients may make disclosure 
decisions on an ad hoc basis, but most governments have a complex legal 
regime for controlling their information.188 This regime includes statutes 
and regulations prohibiting the disclosure of certain information (such as 
 
 
acting on behalf of an organization knows that an actual or apparent agent of the organization 
acts or intends or refuses to act in a manner that is or may be a violation of law reasonably 
imputable to the organization, or in a manner which is likely to result in substantial injury to 
the organization, the [lawyer] shall not violate his or her duty of protecting all confidential 
information . . . .  
CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-600(B) (2008). In contrast, Model Rule 1.13(c) permits an 
entity lawyer to disclose otherwise confidential information if “the highest authority that can act on 
behalf of the [entity] insists upon or fails to address in a timely and appropriate manner an action, or a 
refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of law.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(C) 
(2007). 
 187. California Rule of Professional Conduct 3-600(B) states that the entity lawyer who knows of 
wrongdoing 
may take such actions as appear to the member to be in the best lawful interest of the 
organization. Such actions may include among others: 
 (1) Urging reconsideration of the matter while explaining its likely consequences to the 
organization; or  
 (2) Referring the matter to the next higher authority in the organization, including, if 
warranted by the seriousness of the matter, referral to the highest internal authority that can 
act on behalf of the organization. 
CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-600(B) (2007). In contrast, Model Rule 1.13(b) requires an 
entity lawyer in such circumstances to “refer the matter to higher authority in the organization.” 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2007). 
 188. Cramton, supra note 10, at 294 (referring to the “pervasive regulations [that] govern much of 
the information with which a government lawyer must necessarily deal”). 
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private information about a particular taxpayer);189 rules requiring 
disclosure of other types of information (such as an agency’s 
organizational structure and its final decisions);190 rules requiring 
disclosure of certain information upon request (such as unclassified, 
unprivileged information that must be disclosed under the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA));191 and additional rules allowing the government 
to withhold some of the requested information (such as documents subject 
to FOIA exceptions).192 This Part asserts that, as a substantive matter, 
government lawyers may disclose information that the government is 
required to disclose—either in general or in response to a FOIA request.  
A. Norm of Openness Regarding Government Wrongdoing 
One state has adopted a specific exception to confidentiality for 
government wrongdoing. Hawaii’s confidentiality rule explicitly permits 
government lawyers to disclose information about both future and past 
wrongdoing by government officials. Government lawyers licensed by 
Hawaii may disclose information in order to prevent a government official 
or agency “from committing a criminal or illegal act” that the lawyer 
believes would “result in harm to the public good”193 or to rectify the 
consequences of a government official’s or agency’s “criminal or illegal” 
act that the lawyer reasonably believes was “harmful to the public 
good.”194  
But are lawyers licensed outside of Hawaii free to disclose government 
wrongdoing even though there is no explicit exception?195 This section 
argues that many governments have consented to the disclosure of past 
misconduct by government employees—including lawyers. One finds 
such consent in laws encouraging all government employees to come 
forward with information about misconduct and in whistleblower 
protection statutes. This section discusses whistleblower protection 
statutes and how they interact with the lawyer’s ethical obligation of 
confidentiality. 
 
 
 189. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(8)(B)(iv) (2000). 
 190. Id. § 552(a)(1)–(2).  
 191. Id. § 552(a)(3). 
 192. Id. § 552(b). 
 193. HAW. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c)(4) (2007). 
 194. Id. R. 1.6(c)(5). 
 195. One finds in the scholarly literature an undertheorized intuition that government lawyers 
should be able to disclose government wrongdoing. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 121, at 1260–61 
(proposing a confidentiality rule for judicial clerks, with an exception for “specific wrongdoing”).  
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1. Statutes Encouraging Government Employees to Disclose 
Government Wrongdoing 
Jesselyn Radack was working at the Justice Department’s 
Professional Responsibility Advisory Office in December 2001 
when she received a phone call from an FBI lawyer who wanted to 
find out whether the FBI could legally interrogate John Walker 
Lindh, an American in Afghanistan who was being held by 
American forces. CNN had broadcast an interview with Lindh, and 
the Attorney General had announced that the government would 
prosecute Lindh to the full extent of the law. In response, Lindh’s 
father hired a lawyer to represent him. Lindh’s lawyer faxed a letter 
to the Attorney General and the FBI Director informing them that 
Lindh was represented by counsel. The FBI lawyer wanted to know 
whether the government could legally interrogate Lindh, since a 
legal ethics rule prohibits a lawyer from speaking to another 
lawyer’s client without that other lawyer’s permission.196 Radack 
told the FBI lawyer that the ethics rule prohibited such an 
interrogation. A couple of days later, the FBI lawyer informed 
Radack that the interrogation had occurred and together they 
strategized about how the government should handle the situation. 
The FBI lawyer and Radack exchanged numerous emails, which 
Radack printed out and put into the case file. 
 About a month later, Radack was given a poor performance 
evaluation and told that unless she left the Justice Department, the 
evaluation would become part of her personnel file. Radack began 
looking for a different job. A few weeks later, the FBI lawyer 
contacted Radack again because the district court in the Lindh 
prosecution had ordered the Justice Department to disclose all 
documents related to the legality of the Lindh interrogation. Radack 
looked through the case file for the emails on this issue and could 
find only two of them. After consulting a more experienced 
colleague, Radack concluded that someone had cleansed the file. 
Radack asked the information technology specialists to recover the 
e-mails electronically, and they were able to recover some of them. 
When Radack informed her supervisor of the action she had taken 
in recovering the missing e-mails, the supervisor was not pleased.  
 
 
 196. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2007). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 1033 Clark book pages.doc  5/20/2008 11:28:00 AM  
 
 
 
 
 
1076 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 85:1033 
 
 
 
 
 Radack eventually left the Justice Department and started her 
new job. One morning, Radack heard Newsweek’s David Isikoff 
report that the Attorney General said the Justice Department had 
never taken the position that its interrogation of Lindh had been 
illegal. Radack thought that this meant that Justice Department did 
not disclose her e-mails to the district court judge. She had retained 
copies of those e-mails and faxed them to Isikoff, who put them on 
the Newsweek website. After an Inspector General investigation 
pointed to Radack as the likely source for the leak of these e-mails, 
the Justice Department opened a criminal investigation of Radack 
and filed ethics charges against her in the two jurisdictions where 
she was licensed as a lawyer, Maryland and the District of 
Columbia. The Maryland bar authorities decided not to pursue a 
case against Radack. The District of Columbia has not yet made a 
decision on the Justice Department complaint.197 
A variety of statutes indicate that the government does not claim to 
have a legitimate interest in keeping secret information about government 
wrongdoing. In 1958, Congress adopted a resolution calling upon all 
government employees to “[e]xpose corruption wherever discovered.”198 
More concretely, federal, state, and local governments have passed dozens 
of whistleblower statutes prohibiting retaliation against government 
employees who disclose government wrongdoing.199  
At the federal level, federal law prohibits retaliation against certain 
executive-branch employees who disclose information that they 
 
 
 197. See generally Jane Mayer, Lost in the Jihad, NEW YORKER, Mar. 10, 2003, at 50. For an 
excellent analysis of Radack’s situation using insights from rational-choice theory and psychology, see 
David McGowan, Politics, Office Politics, and Legal Ethics: A Case Study in the Strategy of 
Judgment, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1057, 1058–70 (2007) (asserting that a rational actor in Radack’s 
position would not conclude that the Justice Department failed to disclose the emails to the federal 
district court). 
 198. H.R. Con. Res. 175, 85th Cong. July 11, 1958, 72 Stat. B12 (1958) (“[I]t is the sense of the 
Congress that the following Code of Ethics should be adhered to by all Government employees . . . . 
Expose corruption wherever discovered.”). But cf. Kenneth W. Dam, The Special Responsibilities of 
Lawyers in the Executive Branch, 55 CHI. BAR REC. 4, 8 (1974) (asserting that this Concurrent 
Procedure should not “be regarded as having the force of law [because] the legislative history itself 
states that it ‘creates no new law’”). 
 199. Robert T. Begg, Whistleblower Law and Ethics, in ETHICAL STANDARDS IN THE PUBLIC 
SECTOR: A GUIDE FOR GOVERNMENT LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND PUBLIC OFFICIALS 156, 161, 168 
(Patricia E. Salkin ed., 1999) [hereinafter ETHICAL STANDARDS] (asserting that forty-six states and 
“even some local governments” have adopted whistleblower protection statutes); Radack, supra note 
10, at 136 (asserting that thirty-eight states have adopted whistleblower protection for government 
employees). See generally DANIEL P. WESTMAN & NANCY M. MODESITT, WHISTLEBLOWING: THE 
LAW OF RETALIATORY DISCHARGE (2d ed. 2004). 
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“reasonably believe[] evidences . . . a violation of any law, rule, or 
regulation, . . . gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of 
authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.”200 
The statute applies to many but not all executive-branch employees. In 
general, it applies to civil service employees, to career appointees in the 
Senior Executive Service, and to employees in the “excepted service” 
unless their positions have been “excepted from the competitive service 
because of [their] confidential, policy-determining, policy-making, or 
policy-advocating character.”201 It does not apply to military service 
members or to employees of the FBI, CIA, NSA, or any other agency or 
unit of an agency that the President determines has as its “principal 
function . . . foreign intelligence or counterintelligence.”202 Employees of 
the judicial and legislative branches are also excluded from its coverage.203 
Employees can blow the whistle internally by disclosing the 
information to another government official, such as an inspector general, 
or externally by disclosing it to someone outside government, such as a 
member of the press.204 Where disclosure of the information is not 
“specifically prohibited by law,” the employee may choose either internal 
or external disclosure.205 But if disclosure of the information is 
 
 
 200. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A)(i)–(ii) (2000). The statute provides protection to current 
employees, former employees, and applicants. 5 U.S.C. § 1221(a) (2000). For an excellent discussion 
of the federal Whistleblower Protection Act and its history, see Begg, supra note 199, in ETHICAL 
STANDARDS, supra note 199, at 156. 
 201. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(B) (2000). 
 202. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii) (2000). Congress has passed legislation providing limited 
whistleblower protection to intelligence agency employees and military service members who disclose 
information to members of Congress. Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998 
§ 702(b), Pub. L. No. 105-272, 112 Stat. 2413 (codified at Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. 
app. § 8H); Military Whistleblower Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1034 (2000); see also LOUIS FISHER, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., NATIONAL SECURITY WHISTLEBLOWERS (2005). Rep. Waxman has 
introduced legislation that would provide additional whistleblower protection to employees of these 
agencies who disclose information to an agency Inspector General or to certain members of Congress. 
Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2007, H.R. 985, 110th Cong. § 10(a) (2007). 
 203. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(C) (2000) (defining the statute’s coverage as executive-branch 
agencies and the Government Printing Office). Senator Grassley has introduced legislation that would 
provide some whistleblower protection to legislative-branch employees. See Congressional 
Whistleblower Protection Act of 2007, S. 508, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 204. If the employee is disclosing information the disclosure of which is “specifically prohibited 
by law,” including information that is “specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret,” then 
the employee will be protected from retaliation only if he discloses the information to an agency 
Inspector General, to the Special Counsel, or to another official designated by the agency head. 
Otherwise, the employee is not protected against retaliation. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A)–(B) (2000); see 
H.R. REP. NO. 103-769, at 18 (1994), quoted in L. PAIGE WHITAKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE 
WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION ACT: AN OVERVIEW 4 (2007), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/ 
natsec/RL33918.pdf. 
 205. While the Whistleblower Protection Act purports to protect any disclosure, the Court of 
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“specifically prohibited by law,” then in order to be protected from 
reprisal, the government employee must disclose the information 
internally to one of several identified government officials.206 
Many government lawyers are within the class of employees protected 
by the statute.207 For these lawyers, what effect does the Federal statute 
have on their professional obligation of confidentiality under state ethics 
rules? Several commentators have attempted to answer this question.  
The first to examine this question was Roger Cramton, who in 1991 
concluded that the whistleblower statute supersedes state ethics rules 
because of the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause.208 But Cramton was 
writing before Congress’s 1998 enactment of the McDade Amendment, 
which requires that federal government lawyers comply with state legal 
ethics rules.209 In the post–McDade Amendment era, one can no longer 
rely on the Supremacy Clause to privilege federal whistleblower 
protection over state confidentiality rules.  
A second commentator, Jesselyn Radack (who blew the whistle on 
alleged government misconduct as described at the beginning of this 
 
 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit—the only appellate court with jurisdiction over whistleblower 
lawsuits—has construed the statute narrowly, and has excluded from protection disclosures to 
supervisors within the chain of command, to co-workers, and to suspected wrongdoers. Radack, supra 
note 10, at 136 n.76 (citing Huffman v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 263 F.3d 1341, 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 
2001)).  
 206. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(B) (2000). 
 207. Government lawyers have filed whistleblower claims, primarily for internal whistleblowing. 
See, e.g., Kalil v Dept. of Agric., 479 F.3d 821 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (rejecting whistleblower claim by 
government employee who was licensed as a lawyer and allegedly disclosed government misconduct 
to Justice Department officials and federal district court clerk); Buckley v. Social Sec. Admin., 125 
Fed. App’x. 988, 989–90 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (rejecting government lawyer’s whistleblower claim after he 
allegedly made an internal disclosure); DeLeonardo, 2006 M.S.P.B. 269 (2006) (remanding for further 
consideration of government lawyer’s claim that she was retaliated against for internal 
whistleblowing).  
 208. Cramton writes:  
Although the whistleblower provisions deal expressly only with retaliatory actions of the 
employing agency, the application of professional discipline by a state disciplinary board is 
likely to be precluded. If that were not the case, the federal goal of assuring disclosure of 
official wrongdoing would be subverted by state law, which expresses a contrary policy of 
protecting confidences. The supremacy clause assures that the federal policy of disclosure 
prevails over the inconsistent state policy of confidentiality. 
Cramton, supra note 10, at 312. Cramton noted that no lawyer had attempted to defend disclosure 
using the Whistleblower Protection Act and acknowledged that there was uncertainty about the 
interaction of whistleblower protection with the confidentiality duty. Id. at 314–15. 
 209. 28 U.S.C. § 530B(a) (2000) states that “[a]n attorney for the Government shall be subject to 
State laws and rules, and local Federal court rules, governing attorneys in each State where such 
attorney engages in that attorney’s duties, to the same extent and in the same manner as other attorneys 
in that State.” Act of Oct. 21, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, Sec. 101(b), § 801(a), 112 Stat. 2681, 2681–
118 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 530B(a) (2000)).  
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section), has argued that government lawyers are permitted to make 
whistleblowing disclosures because the confidentiality rule has an 
exception permitting disclosure of information in order “to comply with 
other law.”210 But Radack’s argument would be persuasive only if the 
federal whistleblowing law actually required government employees to 
blow the whistle on government wrongdoing. A third commentator, James 
Moliterno, recently asserted that the federal whistleblowing statute 
functions as the government’s consent to lawyers’ disclosure of 
wrongdoing.211 But Moliterno never addresses whether the statute’s 
provision restricting disclosures that are “specifically prohibited by law” 
prevents government lawyers from blowing the whistle externally.212  
What is the proper application of the whistleblowing statute to 
government lawyers? For purposes of blowing the whistle on wrongdoing, 
are lawyers no different from other government employees? Does their 
professional duty of confidentiality simply melt away in the face of 
information evidencing “a violation of any law, rule, or regulation, . . . 
gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a 
substantial and specific danger to public health or safety”?213 Does the 
restriction on disclosures “specifically prohibited by law” apply to 
information that is covered by a lawyer’s ethical duty of confidentiality? If 
so, then a government lawyer may blow the whistle only through internal 
disclosure to the specified government officials.  
The Merit Systems Protection Board, the administrative agency that 
adjudicates whistleblower claims, has ruled that when the statute specifies 
 
 
 210. Radack, supra note 10, at 133–35 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(6) 
(2007)). 
 211. Moliterno, supra note 10, at 644–47. 
 212. In addition, Moliterno incorrectly asserts that another statute, 28 U.S.C. § 535(b), allows 
government employees—including lawyers—to disclose criminal misconduct to those outside the 
government. Id. at 644 (“Statutes such as 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) . . . are express waivers of confidentiality 
. . . .”). But § 535(b) requires government employees to make such disclosures to the Attorney 
General, not outside the government. 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) (2000 & Supp. V 2005) states:  
Any information, allegation, matter, or complaint witnessed, discovered, or received in a 
department or agency of the executive branch of the Government relating to violations of 
Federal criminal law involving Government officers and employees shall be expeditiously 
reported to the Attorney General by the head of the department or agency, or the witness, 
discoverer, or recipient, as appropriate . . . .  
Moliterno is not the only commentator to misconstrue this statute. Steven Berenson also asserts that 
“to the extent that [28 U.S.C. § 535(b)] trumps the broader duty of confidentiality owed by an attorney 
to their clients, it . . . represents a narrowing of the scope of confidentiality that government attorneys 
can offer to their clients.” Berenson, supra note 10, at 40 (footnote call number omitted). But this 
statute does not trump confidentiality at all because it requires reporting of wrongdoing within the 
client to the Attorney General, not reporting outside of the client. 
 213. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A)(i)–(ii) (2000).  
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disclosures that are “specifically prohibited by law,” it refers only to 
disclosures that are prohibited by statute or by executive orders dealing 
with classified information.214 Legislative history supports a narrow 
reading of this provision, as Congress was concerned that agencies would 
restrict the ability of employees to blow the whistle on wrongdoing by 
issuing regulations mandating confidentiality.215  
Congress did not differentiate between government lawyers and other 
government employees in its whistleblower protection. One may question 
whether it is appropriate to allow government lawyers to be as free to 
publicly disclose alleged government misconduct as are other government 
employees.216 As Roger Cramton has noted, government lawyers should 
be able to reveal an alleged “cover-up of corrupt conduct,” but the federal 
whistleblowing statute may go “too far in eroding the loyalty and 
confidentiality that government lawyers owe to the governmental 
client.”217 In light of a lawyer’s obligation to communicate with her 
client,218 should not a lawyer be required to attempt to solve the problem 
internally, and go outside only if internal measures are ineffective?219  
As a policy matter, the federal government’s whistleblower protection 
seems to go too far in allowing government lawyers to blow the whistle 
externally without first requiring them to try internal whistleblowing. Until 
Congress does differentiate between government lawyers and other 
government employees in its whistleblower protection, the federal statute 
signals the government’s consent to its lawyers’ disclosure of government 
wrongdoing. 
This Part has discussed in detail how the federal government’s 
Whistleblower Protection Act applies to executive-branch lawyers. State 
 
 
 214. Kent, 56 M.S.P.R. 536, 542–43 (1993) (disclosure prohibited by Federal Acquisition 
Regulation was not “specifically prohibited by law” under whistleblower statute). 
 215. Id. (discussing legislative history); Cramton, supra note 10, at 311–12 (same). 
 216. Courts are split on whether corporate in-house counsel should be treated the same as other 
corporate employees for the purpose of retaliatory discharge claims, which are the common law analog 
to statutory whistleblowing claims. Compare Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 
495–96, 504–05 (Cal. 1994) (permitting corporate in-house counsel to pursue retaliatory discharge 
claim as long as the claim can be established without breaching attorney-client privilege), with Balla v. 
Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 105–09 (Ill. 1991) (prohibiting corporate in-house counsel from 
bringing retaliatory discharge claims). 
 217. Cramton, supra note 10, at 309, 213 (“If these are permitted disclosures, the confidentiality 
duties of lawyers employed by the federal government have been significantly eroded.”). 
 218. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2007). 
 219. See id. 1.13 (requiring an entity lawyer to disclose wrongdoing up the chain of command 
within the entity, and permitting the lawyer to make external disclosure if the entity’s leadership fails 
to adequately address the wrongdoing); see also Orly Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational Citizenship, 
and the Laws of Overlapping Obligations, CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008). 
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and local government lawyers may receive similar protections, depending 
on the scope of the applicable whistleblower laws and their state ethics 
rules.220 A similar analysis of particular state and local whistleblower 
protection laws would be required to determine whether those laws serve 
as the government’s consent to disclosure by government lawyers. 
2. Common-Law Doctrines Regarding the Disclosure of Government 
Wrongdoing  
The coverage of whistleblower statutes is broad, but not 
comprehensive. But even government lawyers who fall outside the 
protection of whistleblower statutes may be able to disclose past 
government wrongdoing. Two lines of common-law decisions support the 
government lawyer’s ability to disclose past government wrongdoing. 
First, in construing the government’s evidentiary privileges, courts have 
found exceptions to those privileges for government wrongdoing. Second, 
courts have permitted lawyers for a fiduciary to disclose the fiduciary’s 
wrongdoing to the beneficiaries. The following section addresses these 
common-law doctrines. 
The norm of exposing government wrongdoing surfaces not just in 
whistleblower protection statutes, but also in court decisions construing 
the government’s evidentiary privileges to allow the exposure of 
government wrongdoing. These courts have found that a government’s 
very legitimacy depends on its abiding by its own laws.221 They have 
found a “strong public interest in honest government and in exposing 
wrongdoing by public officials”222 and have concluded that concealing 
government wrongdoing “would represent a gross misuse of public 
assets.”223 One long-time observer put it this way: “‘[I]f there is 
wrongdoing in government, it must be exposed. . . . [The government 
 
 
 220. WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 199, at 66–76. 
 221. In re County of Erie, 473 F.3d 413, 419 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[P]ublic officials are duty-bound to 
understand and respect constitutional, judicial and statutory limitations on their authority . . . .”). 
 222. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 921 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 223. Id. at 915–21 (denying White House claim of attorney client privilege in Independent 
Counsel’s investigation); see also In re A Witness Before Special Grand Jury 2000–2, 288 F.3d 289, 
293 (7th Cir. 2002) (denying former Illinois Secretary of State George Ryan’s assertion of attorney-
client privilege in federal criminal investigation (“It would be both unseemly and a misuse of public 
assets to permit a public official to use a taxpayer-provided attorney to conceal from the taxpayers 
themselves otherwise admissible evidence of financial wrongdoing, official misconduct, or abuse of 
power.”)). 
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lawyer’s] duty to the people, the law, and his own conscience requires 
disclosure . . . .’”224 
One finds these statements in cases dealing with the government’s 
evidentiary privileges.225 Across a range of different evidentiary 
privileges, courts have limited the government’s ability to keep secret 
information about government officials’ wrongdoing. This Part examines 
governmental attorney-client, deliberative-process, state-secrets, and 
presidential-communications privileges. In each of these areas, courts have 
rejected governmental privilege where the privilege would prevent 
disclosure of government wrongdoing. 
In the last decade, four federal appellate courts have examined whether 
governments can assert attorney-client privilege in the face of federal 
grand jury investigations of alleged corruption.226 The first two of these 
decisions arose out of Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr’s investigation 
of the Clinton White House227 and involved a federal executive-branch 
lawyer disclosing information about alleged wrongdoing to another federal 
executive-branch lawyer, the Independent Counsel, through the 
mechanism of a grand jury subpoena. Since most executive-branch 
employees have a statutory obligation to disclose evidence of wrongdoing 
to the Attorney General,228 and the Independent Counsel stood in the role 
of the Attorney General for matters under its jurisdiction,229 these cases 
might be seen as simple applications of the mandatory-reporting statute in 
the Independent Counsel context. Alternatively, one might argue that there 
was no breach of lawyer confidentiality in these cases at all, as long as one 
conceives of the lawyer’s client as the entire executive branch.230 But the 
courts in these cases did not base their decisions on these theories. Instead, 
 
 
 224. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1273 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (alterations in original) (quoting 
Weinstein, supra note 176, at 160). 
 225. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 226. In addition, the Sixth Circuit ruled that the City of Detroit could assert attorney-client 
privilege to prevent disclosure in a grand jury investigation, but remanded for further determination of 
whether the city council’s private meeting with its lawyer was legal under state open government laws. 
In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 886 F.2d 135, 138–39 (6th Cir. 1989). Similarly, New Jersey appellate 
court allowed a locality to assert attorney-client privilege in a state grand jury investigation. In re 
Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum by Sussex County on Farber, 574 A.2d 449, 454–55 (N.J. Ct. 
App. Div. 1989) [hereinafter In re Farber]. 
 227. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 913–14, 915–21 (rejecting President 
Clinton’s claim of the privilege); see also In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1263 (same). 
 228. 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) (2000 & Supp. V 2005). But see Dam, supra note 198, at 7 (asserting that 
although this statute requires agency heads to report criminal violations to the Attorney General, it 
does not require government employees to report them to the agency head). 
 229. See 28 U.S.C. § 510 (2000). 
 230. Cf. Paulsen, supra note 11, at 487. 
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the courts seemed to assume that the client was a particular government 
agency, and that disclosing the information would breach the lawyer’s 
confidentiality obligation to that agency.231 The courts justified allowing 
this breach of confidentiality with general statements about the repugnance 
of keeping government wrongdoing secret.232  
The remaining two appellate cases involved federal criminal 
investigations of corrupt state governments. In a case arising out of a 
federal investigation of former Illinois Secretary of State George Ryan, the 
Seventh Circuit ruled that the state’s interest in lawyer confidentiality 
must give way to the federal government’s interest in rooting out 
government wrongdoing.233 In a case involving former Connecticut 
Governor John Rowland, the Second Circuit ruled that the state’s interest 
in lawyer confidentiality prevailed over the federal government’s law 
enforcement interest, relying in part on a Connecticut statute indicating 
that the state government can assert attorney-client privilege in any 
governmental proceeding.234  
With respect to all three types of executive privilege (presidential 
communications, deliberative process, and state secrets), courts have 
rejected government claims of privilege where application of the privilege 
would conceal government wrongdoing. The Supreme Court ruled in 
United States v. Nixon that President Nixon’s claim of the presidential-
communications privilege had to give way to the governmental interest in 
uncovering evidence of wrongdoing.235 In a case rejecting a claim of the 
deliberative-process privilege, a federal district court noted that while 
there is a public interest in the deliberative-process privilege, there is also 
a competing public interest in ensuring “the basic right of the citizen to 
petition his government for the redress of grievances.”236 With respect to 
 
 
 231. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 915–21 (referring to “the White 
House” as the client). 
 232. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1263 (referring to “the public’s interest in uncovering illegality 
among its elected and appointed officials”). 
 233. In re Witness Before Special Grand Jury 2000–2, 288 F.3d 289, 294 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 234. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d 527, 533–36 (2d Cir. 2005). The argument for 
limiting government attorney-client privilege would seem to apply with equal force in civil litigation 
where there are allegations of wrongdoing by government officials, but courts have not accepted these 
arguments. See, e.g., In re County of Erie, 473 F.3d 413, 419 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[I]n civil litigation 
between a government agency and private litigants, the government’s claim to the protections of the 
attorney-client privilege is on a par with the claim of an individual or a corporate entity.”). 
 235. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703–16 (1974); see also In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 
729 (D.C. Cir. 1997).  
 236. Rosee v. Bd. of Trade, 36 F.R.D. 684, 689, 690 (N.D. Ill. 1965) (permitting disclosure of 
otherwise privileged government documents because plaintiff alleged official misconduct and “has 
shown (1) that there is a reasonable basis for his request and (2) that the defendant government agents 
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both the presidential-communications and deliberative-process privilege, 
the executive branch itself has publicly disclaimed any desire to withhold 
information that would disclose government wrongdoing.237 Similarly, in a 
case arising out of the government’s unlawful, warrantless surveillance of 
a private citizen in 1963, the government admitted that its conduct had 
been illegal but nonetheless claimed the state-secrets privilege shielded 
documents regarding the surveillance.238 The district court refused to 
recognize this claim of executive privilege because it would prevent 
discovery of government conduct that was admittedly illegal.239  
The cases described above all deal with a government’s evidentiary 
privileges and exceptions to those privileges allowing one arm of the 
government to compel disclosure of information related to government 
officials’ misconduct. Such exceptions to evidentiary privileges do not 
necessarily imply an analogous exception to a confidentiality duty.240 But 
these exceptions do suggest that the government has a lessened interest in 
keeping confidential information about its own misconduct.  
Additional support for the government lawyer’s ability to reveal 
wrongdoing can be found in cases dealing with the obligations of lawyers 
who represent fiduciaries. A lawyer who represents a fiduciary may reveal 
 
 
played some part in the operative events”); see In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 746 (stating that the 
“[deliberative process] privilege disappears altogether when there is any reason to believe government 
misconduct occurred”). 
 237. See, e.g., Memorandum from Lloyd N. Cutler, Special Counsel to the President, to All 
Executive Department and Agency General Counsels 1 (Sept. 28, 1994) (“In circumstances involving 
communications relating to investigations of personal wrongdoing by government officials, it is our 
practice not to assert executive privilege, either in judicial proceedings or in congressional 
investigations and hearings.”); MORTON ROSENBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PRESIDENTIAL CLAIMS 
OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: HISTORY, LAW, PRACTICE AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 13 (2007), 
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/RL30319.pdf; see also Exec. Order No. 13,292, § 1.7 
3 C.F.R. 196, 200 (2003) (prohibiting government officials from using security classification to 
“conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error” or “prevent embarrassment to a 
person, organization, or agency”). Elsewhere in the national security sphere, the executive orders 
authorizing the classification of national security–related information explicitly forbid government 
officials from using the classification system for the purpose of keeping secret government 
wrongdoing or other embarrassing information. 
 238. Black v. Sheraton Corp. of Am., 371 F. Supp. 97, 101 (D.D.C. 1974) (referring to the 
government’s “admitted misconduct”). 
 239. Id. at 101 (rejecting government’s claim of state-secrets privilege regarding FBI’s 
warrantless surveillance because government “[sought] to shelter improper, unauthorized acts from 
disclosure”). On the other hand, the government has often succeeded in asserting the state-secrets 
privilege as a shield against civil litigation challenging unlawful government conduct. See, e.g., ACLU 
v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007), Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
 240. While there is widespread recognition of a crime fraud exception to attorney-client privilege, 
some states still do not recognize an exception to lawyers’ confidentiality obligation for client fraud. 
See, e.g., MO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4-1.6(b) (2007). 
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the fiduciary’s wrongdoing to the beneficiary.241 Since government 
officials are fiduciaries of the public, these court decisions suggest that 
government lawyers may disclose government officials’ wrongdoing to 
the public.242 
This Part has argued that both whistleblowing statutes and common-
law doctrines support government lawyers’ ability to disclose government 
wrongdoing. Applying this analysis to Jesselyn Radack’s disclosure 
discussed at the beginning of this Part, she may have believed that the 
government made an incomplete disclosure to the federal court hearing 
John Walker Lindh’s criminal case. But, as discussed later in this Article, 
she should have pursued her concerns within the Justice Department prior 
to breaching confidentiality. The following Part asserts that government 
lawyers may disclose information that would be subject to mandatory 
disclosure under freedom of information laws.  
B. Open Government Laws Should Be Construed as Client Consent to 
Disclosure 
Jeffrey Toobin, a federal prosecutor, wrote a memoir about his 
experiences working on the Iran-Contra investigation.243 While 
working on that case, Toobin was subject to two separate 
confidentiality regimes: the legal ethics obligation of 
confidentiality244 and the secrecy and prepublication-review 
requirements for government officials who have access to highly 
classified national security information.245 In connection with the 
latter obligations, Toobin submitted his manuscript to the Central 
 
 
 241. Robert W. Tuttle, The Fiduciary’s Fiduciary: Legal Ethics in Fiduciary Representation, 
1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 889, 949. For a discussion of some parallels between representation of fiduciaries 
and representation of fiduciary entities, see Jeffrey N. Pennell, Representations Involving Fiduciary 
Entities: Who Is the Client?, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1319 (1994). 
 242. See Kathleen Clark, Do We Have Enough Ethics in Government Yet?: An Answer from 
Fiduciary Theory, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 57, 73–77 (government officials owe fiduciary duties); Green, 
supra note 67, at 269 (“Whether one views the client as the government, a government agency or a 
government official, the client is distinctive in at least this respect: the client owes fiduciary duties to 
the public. It may then be suggested that the government lawyer owes some derivative duties to the 
public . . . .”). 
 243. JEFFREY TOOBIN, OPENING ARGUMENTS—A YOUNG LAWYER’S FIRST CASE: UNITED 
STATES V. OLIVER NORTH (1991).  
 244. Toobin was licensed in New York and thus subject to the N.Y. CODE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (2007) (requiring lawyers to maintain the confidentiality of client 
confidences and secrets). 
 245. See discussion of these obligations in McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1983), 
and Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).  
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Intelligence Agency, which reviewed it to ensure that it did not 
contain any confidential national security–related information, and 
it passed that review.246 His former supervisor, Iran-Contra 
Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh, was concerned about the 
disclosure of information about the Independent Counsel’s office. 
Walsh threatened to file a bar disciplinary complaint if Toobin went 
forward with publication. Toobin and his publisher filed suit 
preemptively, seeking a declaratory judgment that publication 
would not violate his ethical obligation of confidentiality. Walsh 
countersued, claiming that publication would breach lawyer 
confidentiality, grand-jury secrecy, and the federal regulation 
barring employees from disclosing nonpublic government 
information. While the district court refused to rule on the legal 
ethics claim, it rejected Walsh’s argument that grand-jury secrecy 
was so broad that it prohibited the manuscript’s physical 
descriptions of the prosecutors and rejected Walsh’s regulatory 
claim because it found that the only nonpublic government 
information revealed was trivial.247 This district court decision has 
no precedential value, however, because the appellate court 
eventually vacated it in response to the publisher’s decision to 
publish the book before the appellate court had an opportunity to 
hear the oral arguments in the case.248 Although Walsh sent a draft 
ethics complaint to Toobin’s then-current employer (the federal 
prosecutor for the Eastern District of New York), he never did file a 
complaint with bar authorities. 
One difference between governments and private clients is the way 
they control their information. This difference is significant because 
lawyers are permitted to disclose client information if the client consents. 
Private individual clients generally have an ad hoc approach to controlling 
their information. A lawyer who represents a private client and wants to 
disclose particular information can seek that client’s consent. Even in the 
case of an entity client, the lawyer could go to the appropriate 
representative of the entity and ask for consent to make the disclosure.249 
That individual can make the decision of whether to grant or withhold the 
entity’s consent on an ad hoc basis. 
 
 
 246. Penguin Books USA, Inc. v. Walsh, 756 F. Supp. 770 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 247. Id. at 783–84. 
 248. Penguin Books USA, Inc. v. Walsh, 929 F.2d 69, 74 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 249. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) & cmt. 1, 1.6(a) (2007). 
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Governments, on the other hand, generally have a complex legal 
regime for the control and disclosure of their information. A government 
official cannot consent to a lawyer’s disclosure of this information without 
first considering that complex legal regime. This regime can be divided 
into four categories: laws that prohibit the government from disclosing 
information, laws that require the government to disclose information, 
laws that require the government to disclose certain information upon 
specific request, and laws that exempt some information from mandatory 
disclosure upon that request.  
Some statutes and regulations prohibit the government from disclosing 
information.250 These include laws that protect information about 
individuals’ privacy, such as the Privacy Act,251 statutes that prevent the 
government from revealing information from individuals’ tax returns,252 
and statutes, executive orders, and regulations that prevent the government 
from revealing security-related information, such as the requirements that 
the Director of National Intelligence protect intelligence sources and 
methods and that atomic and cryptographic information be safeguarded.253 
In addition, executive-branch regulations prohibit employees from 
disclosing “nonpublic” information for their own or a third party’s 
benefit.254 The difficulty comes in determining which government 
information is considered to be “nonpublic.”  
A second category of information-related laws actually requires the 
government to disclose certain information. For example, at the federal 
level each executive-branch agency is required to disclose a description of 
how it is organized, statements of its functions and procedures, 
descriptions of forms, “statements of general policy or interpretations of 
general applicability,”255 statements of policy and interpretations, final 
opinions and orders made in the adjudication of cases, and manuals and 
 
 
 250. See, e.g., Hollywood v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 598, 607 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) 
(disqualifying prosecutor who “virtually gave the entire [prosecution] file, owned by the public, to the 
filmmakers” who were considering making a film about a case against a capital defendant, perhaps in 
violation of laws restricting dissemination of documents to third persons), cert. granted, 149 P.3d 737 
(Cal. 2006). 
 251. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2000). 
 252. 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (2000). 
 253. 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(g)(1)(d) (2000) (intelligence sources and methods); 42 U.S.C. § 2272 
(2000) (atomic energy information); 28 U.S.C. § 798(a)(1) (1992) (cryptographic information). 
 254. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.703 (2007); see OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN. DEP’T OF INTERIOR REPORT OF 
INVESTIGATION: JULIE MACDONALD, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, FISH, WILDLIFE AND PARKS, 
21–22 (2007) (concluding that government official violated 5 C.F.R. § 2635.703 when she shared with 
industry lobbyist draft policies that were not subject to disclosure under FOIA). 
 255. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (2000). 
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instructions that affect members of the public.256 Similarly, the federal 
government and the states have myriad open meeting laws requiring much 
of the government’s business to occur in public.257 
A third category of information-related law requires the government to 
disclose information upon request. The Federal Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA) imposes this obligation on all executive-branch agencies, but 
exempts the legislative and judicial branches.258 But some of what the 
government giveth with one hand, it taketh away with the other. The 
Federal FOIA has nine exceptions, the most important of which are the 
following: where a statute prohibits the government from disclosing the 
information;259 where an executive order authorizes the government to 
keep the information secret;260 where an evidentiary privilege would 
protect that document from disclosure in litigation;261 certain law 
enforcement documents;262 and personnel or medical files that, if released, 
would constitute a violation of personal privacy.263  
It is by no means obvious how open government laws should mesh 
with the law of attorney-client confidentiality. But courts and 
commentators have tackled this type of issue scores of times in an attempt 
to harmonize open meeting laws with the law on attorney-client privilege. 
Courts generally acknowledge the conflicting principles behind these two 
areas of law and attempt to find an accommodation between these two 
principles.264  
 
 
 256. Id. § 552(a)(2). 
 257. Id. § 552(b). A list of state open meeting laws can be found at the National Freedom of 
Information Coalition, http://www.nfoic.org/foi-center/state-foi-laws.html.  
 258. 5 U.S.C. § 552. A list of state freedom of information laws can be found at the National 
Freedom of Information Coalition, http://www.nfoic.org/foi-center/state-foi-laws.html. 
 259. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (2000). 
 260. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2000). 
 261. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2000). 
 262. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (2000). 
 263. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2000). 
 264. See, e.g., State v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 298 F.3d 60, 63 (1st Cir. 2002) (discussing “the 
tension between the substantive provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, 
and the application of the attorney-client and work-product privileges”); Dunn v. Ala. State Univ. Bd. 
of Trs., 628 So. 2d 519, 529–30 (Ala. 1993) (despite state open meeting law, state university board of 
trustees can meet in secret with its attorney in order to obtain attorney’s legal advice on pending 
litigation), overruled on other grounds by Proctor v. Riley, 903 So. 2d 786, 791 (Ala. 2004); Laman v. 
McCord, 432 S.W.2d 753, 756 (Ark. 1968) (attorney-client privilege, which is codified in the state’s 
civil code, did not create an exemption to the state’s open meeting law); Roberts v. City of Palmdale, 
853 P.2d 496 (Cal. 1993) (applying attorney-client privilege exception to California Public Records 
Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE, § 6250 (West 2007), and the Ralph M. Brown Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE 
§ 54950 (West 2007)); Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento County Bd. of Supervisors, 69 
Cal. Rptr. 480, 492 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (open meeting law “did not abolish the statutory 
opportunity of boards of supervisors to confer privately with their attorney on occasions properly 
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Government employees who make unauthorized disclosures of 
government information can be disciplined administratively or by bar 
authorities if they are lawyers, and they can even be subjected to criminal 
prosecution under limited circumstances. The government has criminally 
prosecuted leaks of national security and other information as thefts of 
government property.265  
This Article argues that to determine the scope of a government 
lawyer’s confidentiality duty, one must look not just at legal ethics 
doctrine but also at the government’s information-control regime. Dozens 
of courts have taken a similar approach in a related legal context: 
determining the scope of the government attorney-client privilege. State 
courts across the country have determined what information state and local 
governments can claim to be privileged by looking closely at state open 
meeting laws and coming to an accommodation between these open 
government laws and the traditions of confidential lawyer-client 
relations.266  
As discussed above, the government, like any client, can consent to 
disclosure of information that would otherwise be protected by lawyer 
confidentiality. But, unlike other clients, the government’s decision about 
consent is constrained by its legal regime for the control of its information. 
To determine the scope of the government’s consent to lawyer disclosure, 
 
 
requiring confidentiality”); Neu v. Miami Herald Publ’g Co., 462 So. 2d 821, 824–26 (Fla. 1985) 
(state sunshine law applied even to city council meetings with city attorney, preventing application of 
attorney-client privilege to those meetings); Harris v. Balt. Sun Co., 625 A.2d 941, 947 (Md. 1993) 
(construing lawyer confidentiality obligation to prohibit only disclosures that could harm client in case 
involving FOIA request to state public defender’s office); Prior Lake Am. v. Mader, 642 N.W.2d 729, 
737 (Minn. 2002) (open meetings law has exception for meetings with attorney, but “only when there 
is a need for absolute confidentiality”); McKay v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 746 P.2d 124, 128 (Nev. 
1987) (state open meeting law prohibits county board from meeting with its attorney in private); Okla. 
Ass’n of Mun. Att’ys v. State, 577 P.2d 1310, 1314–15 (Okla. 1978) (local government could meet in 
secret with attorney despite state sunshine law); see also Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. McGraw, 461 
S.E.2d 850, 861, 863–64 (W. Va. 1995) (reprimanding state attorney general for revealing information 
in violation of lawyer confidentiality even though the information would be subject to mandatory 
disclosure under state freedom of information law). 
 265. United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1060–63, 1076–80 (4th Cir. 1988) (Defense 
Department employee leaked satellite photos to newspaper convicted of theft of government property 
and espionage); Ashcroft v. Randel, 391 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1217–18 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (Drug 
Enforcement Agency employee leaked government documents to press pleaded guilty to theft of 
government property). 
 266. Roberts, 853 P.2d 496; Sacramento Newspaper, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 492; Maxwell v. Freedom of 
Info. Comm’n, 794 A.2d 535, 538 (Conn. 2002); Neu, 462 So. 2d 821 at 824–25; Prior Lake Am., 642 
N.W.2d at 731; In re Farber, 574 A.2d 449, 455 (N.J. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (harmonizing open meeting 
law with attorney-client privilege); McKay, 746 P.2d 124; Okla. Ass’n, 577 P.2d at 1314–15; 
Markowski v. City of Marlin, 940 S.W.2d 720, 725–27 (Tex. App. 1997); see also Harris, 625 A.2d at 
947–48 (harmonizing state public defender’s confidentiality duty and his disclosure obligation under 
state FOIA). 
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one must examine the government’s information-control regime. 
Government consent occurs as follows: If the information-control regime 
requires the government to disclose particular information (such as an 
agency’s final decision in an adjudication267), then the government has 
consented to disclosure of that information.268 If the government is 
prohibited from disclosing particular information, then the government has 
withheld its consent. But a great deal of government information will fall 
between these two extremes and the government will have the discretion 
to disclose or withhold the information. If the information is subject to 
mandatory disclosure upon request, then, as a substantive matter, the 
government has consented to disclosure. But as a procedural matter, the 
government lawyer should seek the assent of a disinterested government 
official.269 
In addition, unlike private sector clients, governments generally have 
policies favoring disclosure of information unless there is a specific reason 
not to disclose. Demonstrative of this policy are freedom of information 
laws, which set out a general right of access to government records and 
then specify exceptions to that right of access. In other words, when 
someone seeks disclosure of government information, there is a 
presumption that the government will make the information available. 
Where the government refuses to disclose it, the burden is on the 
government to justify the refusal.270 This presumption in favor of 
disclosure is consistent with principles of robust democratic government. 
It also has a constitutional basis, in that the First Amendment requires that 
government employees be permitted to discuss their work unless there is a 
good reason that such disclosures cannot be allowed.271  
One jurisdiction has already made explicit this type of exception to 
confidentiality in the government context. Lawyers licensed by the District 
of Columbia are permitted to disclose “when . . . required by law or court 
 
 
 267. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (2000). 
 268. Cramton, supra note 10, at 294 (“[A] government lawyer’s duty of confidentiality does not 
extend to information that the government has made available upon request to the public. In terms of 
the professional ethics rules, the government in effect has consented to disclosure.”). 
 269. Glavin, supra note 10; see Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 510–13 (1980) (former CIA 
employee breached his fiduciary obligation by failing to comply with agency’s prepublication review 
procedure even though his disclosure contained only information that would be subject to mandatory 
disclosure under FOIA). 
 270. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2000) (where a requester appeals an agency’s denial of information, 
“the burden is on the agency to sustain its action”). 
 271. McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137, 1143–47 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (rejecting former CIA 
employee’s challenge to CIA’s decision preventing him from disclosing confidential national-security 
information).  
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order,”272 but a government lawyer may also disclose when “permitted or 
authorized by law.”273 This language seems to suggest that a government 
lawyer may disclose information whenever disclosure would be permitted 
under open government laws, such as the FOIA.274  
Applying this analysis to Jeff Toobin’s memoir (discussed at the 
beginning of this Part), Toobin’s disclosure appears to be consistent with 
the types of information that are subject to disclosure under the FOIA. 
Also, Toobin followed a disclosure-approval procedure similar to the 
procedure that the next Part recommends be adopted for all government 
lawyers. 
IV. THE NEED FOR AN ORDERLY PROCEDURE FOR DISCLOSURES 
The previous Part identified two ways in which a government lawyer’s 
duty of confidentiality is different from that of a private sector lawyer: 
government lawyers may reveal information about past government 
wrongdoing and may reveal information that the government client must 
reveal under freedom of information (FOI) laws. But the substantive 
standard is only part of the story. There also needs to be a procedure for 
making such disclosures. With regard to misconduct, state supreme courts 
need to set up a procedure requiring the lawyer to give the government 
advance notice of her plan to disclose, similar to the current procedure for 
entity lawyers disclosing misconduct.275 With regard to information 
 
 
 272. D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(e)(2)(A) (2006) (emphasis added). The D.C. Court 
of Appeals adopted a revised set of professional rules effective Feb. 1, 2007. Alberto Mora’s 
disclosure of information occurred prior to the effective date of the new rules, and so this Article 
analyzes his conduct using the version of the D.C. Rules that were effective in 2006. All other 
discussion of the D.C. Rules in this article will refer to the 2007 version. 
 273. Id. R. 1.6(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added). 
 274. A comment accompanying the rule suggests a narrower interpretation. The comment states 
that this provision “is designed to permit disclosures . . . which the government authorizes its attorneys 
to make in connection with their professional services to the government,” id. R. 1.6 cmt. 37, 
suggesting that this provision is aimed only at disclosures that are necessary for the government lawyer 
to carry out her responsibilities. On the other hand, the D.C. confidentiality rule already has another 
exception for disclosures that are “impliedly authorized . . . in order to carry out the representation.” 
Id. R. 1.6(e)(4). In light of the existence of this “impliedly authorized” exception, the government-
lawyer exception should be read as permitting government lawyers to disclose information that may be 
disclosed under the open government laws. 
 275. Model Rule 1.13(b) states: 
If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other person associated 
with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related to 
the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of 
law that reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and that is likely to result in 
substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary 
in the best interest of the organization. Unless the lawyer reasonably believes that it is not 
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covered by FOI laws, governments need to set up a procedure so that 
someone other than the lawyer wishing to disclose makes the 
determination whether this information must be disclosed under the law. 
Otherwise, lawyers attempting to apply the FOI laws themselves are likely 
to have a bias favoring disclosure.276 This Part sketches out a few ideas 
about the appropriate procedures for government lawyers’ disclosing 
government wrongdoing and other government information.  
A. Procedures for Disclosing Government Wrongdoing 
Lieutenant Commander Matt Diaz had spent eighteen years in the 
Navy when he was assigned to be a legal advisor at Guantanamo in 
2004. While there, he became concerned that the U.S. government 
was treating prisoners inhumanely and violating their rights under 
the Geneva Conventions and the U.S. Constitution. Earlier, a 
human rights organization had filed a lawsuit on behalf of the 
prisoners, requesting a list of all those being held at Guantanamo. 
The government had resisted that demand. Just before his 
Guantanamo assignment was to end, Diaz anonymously sent a list 
of the Guantanamo prisoners to a lawyer at the human rights 
organization. The lawyer turned the list over to the judge in the 
case, who gave it to court security personnel. Fingerprint analysis 
pointed to Diaz, who was eventually convicted after a court martial. 
Diaz said, “Obviously I chose the wrong path . . . . [M]y career is 
in . . . much more serious jeopardy than it would have been if I had 
raised the issue to my chain of command.”277 
There are better and worse ways for government lawyers to blow the 
whistle on misconduct. Contrast the approach of Navy JAG Matt Diaz, 
who, without consulting other government officials, secretly and 
anonymously sent a list of Guantanamo detainees to a human rights 
organization, with that of Navy General Counsel Alberto Mora, who 
joined with other government employees who also opposed mistreatment 
 
 
necessary in the best interest of the organization to do so, the lawyer shall refer the matter to 
higher authority in the organization, including, if warranted by the circumstances, to the 
highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization as determined by applicable law. 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2007). 
 276. See Glavin, supra note 10, at 1836–43. 
 277. Brooks Egerton, Losing a Fight for Detainees, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 18, 2007, at 
1A; see also Ari Shapiro, Navy Lawyer’s Guantanamo Leak Trial Begins (Nat’l Pub. Radio broadcast 
May 14, 2007) (audio available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=10173248). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss5/2
p 1033 Clark book pages.doc  5/20/2008 11:28:00 AM  
 
 
 
 
 
2007] GOVERNMENT LAWYERS AND CONFIDENTIALITY NORMS 1093 
 
 
 
 
of prisoners and argued internally for a change in policy.278 Diaz was 
prosecuted and sentenced to six months in prison for the unauthorized 
release of defense information.279 Mora received a “Profile in Courage” 
award from the JFK Library.280 Diaz’s situation points out the need for an 
orderly procedure for disclosures.  
This Article has argued that, as a substantive matter, government 
lawyers are permitted to disclose government wrongdoing. But even if a 
government lawyer’s confidentiality duty has an exception for 
wrongdoing, the lawyer still must communicate adequately with and be 
loyal to her client.281 Because of these other duties, the lawyer needs to 
take certain steps prior to disclosing government wrongdoing. Responsible 
officials may not even be aware of the wrongdoing, and the lawyer should 
alert such officials to the problem prior to disclosing the wrongdoing to 
the public.282 If the wrongdoing is ongoing, the government needs to make 
changes so that it does not continue the misconduct. If the wrongdoing has 
already occurred, the government may need to rectify the harm that the 
past wrongdoing has caused. In either case, the client deserves the 
opportunity to plan for the forthcoming disclosure of the wrongdoing. 
In light of these considerations, the lawyer needs to bring the 
wrongdoing to the attention of a responsible party within the government 
client prior to disclosing the wrongdoing outside the client. The 
responsible party should be given the opportunity to make the appropriate 
changes to prevent future wrongdoing or remedy the harm caused by the 
past wrongdoing. Only after ensuring that a responsible party has received 
notice would it be appropriate for the government lawyer to disclose the 
wrongdoing outside the client. 
Outside disclosure should proceed first to another government official 
or entity that properly has the authority to respond to the specific 
allegations of wrongdoing. For example, if Cindy Ossias had attempted to 
convince the California Insurance Commissioner of the need to change his 
 
 
 278. Egerton, supra note 277. 
 279. Tim Golden, Naming Names at Gitmo, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Oct. 21, 2007, at 78. For an 
interesting analysis of the Diaz case, see Ellen Yaroshefsky, Military Lawyering at the Edge of the 
Rule of Law at Guantanamo: Should Lawyers Be Permitted to Violate the Law?, HOFSTRA L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2008). 
 280. John Shattuck, In Search of Political Courage, BOSTON GLOBE, May 22, 2006, at A11. 
 281. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (b) (2007) (“A lawyer shall explain a matter to 
the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the 
representation.”); Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 1 (“Loyalty and independent judgment are essential elements in the 
lawyer’s relationship to a client.”). 
 282. Id. R. 1.4 cmt. 6 (“When the client is an organization or group, . . . the lawyer should address 
communications to the appropriate officials of the organization.”). 
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policies and had been unsuccessful, then she could have appropriately 
approached either the state attorney general, state auditor, or state 
legislature, all of which would have had authority to investigate the 
alleged misconduct. Only if other government agencies are unwilling or 
unable to take action may the lawyer then disclose the misconduct to the 
public or the press.283 This step-wise disclosure approach is more moderate 
and nuanced than that present in most state and federal whistleblower 
protection statutes, which permit disclosure to anyone. 
This proposed procedure is similar to—but not exactly the same as—
the procedure prescribed for entity lawyers in the new legal ethics rule for 
entities that the American Bar Association adopted after Sarbanes-
Oxley.284 Under the rule, an entity lawyer must attempt to remedy the 
illegal conduct within the entity client. Only if the entity client fails to take 
appropriate action may the lawyer disclose information outside the 
client.285 Under this proposed procedure for government lawyers, the 
lawyer must first bring the information to the attention of an appropriate 
actor within the government client. That official may happen to agree with 
the lawyer’s legal assessment and therefore begin taking corrective 
action.286 On the other hand, the official may convince the lawyer that the 
alleged wrongdoing was not actually illegal.287 One lawyer who could 
have benefited from this approach was Joyce Crandon, who was general 
counsel of the Kansas Office of the State Banking Commissioner, a bank 
regulatory agency. Another agency employee told Crandon that a deputy 
commissioner had obtained loans from two of the regulated banks and 
Crandon believed that the loans were illegal under federal and state 
banking laws. But she did not raise this concern with the deputy 
commissioner or the commissioner. Instead, she reported it to the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The Commissioner learned that 
Crandon reported this situation to the FDIC while he was meeting with the 
 
 
 283. For an example of partial step-wise disclosure, see Carol D. Leonnig & Josh White, An Ex-
Member Calls Detainee Panels Unfair Lawyer Tells of Flawed ‘Combatant’ Rulings, WASH. POST, 
June 23, 2007, at A3 (describing how naval reserve lawyer Stephen E. Abraham repeatedly 
complained to his commander about problems with the Combatant Status Review Commissions at 
Guantanamo before providing an affidavit about those problems for a habeas proceeding on behalf of 
one of the Guantanamo prisoners). Abraham’s approach was not completely step-wise; he could have 
gone outside the client to Congress before going to court. 
 284. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2007). 
 285. Id. R. 1.13(c). 
 286. Compare discussion of the State Department’s “Dissent Channel” in Neal Kumar Katyal, 
Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE 
L.J. 2314, 2328–30 (2006). 
 287. Cf. Crandon v. State., 897 P.2d 92, 103–04 (Kan. 1995). 
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FDIC, and he proceeded to fire Crandon. A state court rejected her 
wrongful discharge claim, finding that she had improperly disclosed 
confidential information.288  
Under this proposed procedure, if the lawyer has given internal notice, 
then, after a reasonable time has passed, the lawyer may publicly disclose 
the wrongdoing even if the government has taken remedial action. This 
different result reflects the different values at stake in entity and 
government representation. The entity procedure is aimed at having the 
lawyer take action to ensure that the entity protects itself from disloyal 
servants.289 If the entity succeeds in remedying the situation, there is no 
need for the lawyer to make a public disclosure. This proposed 
government procedure is simply aimed at giving the government a heads-
up prior to the disclosure of wrongdoing.  
The substantive standard—permitting lawyers to disclose government 
wrongdoing—reflects the fact that governments do not have a legitimate 
interest in keeping wrongdoing secret. This procedural requirement—
requiring lawyers to notify responsible government officials prior to public 
disclosure—will both help the government plan for disclosure and help 
prevent the government lawyer from making the kind of mistake that 
Joyce Crandon and Matt Diaz made. The substantive standard serves to 
protect the public from government wrongdoing. The procedure serves to 
protect governments from overzealous government lawyers.  
In light of the statutory and common-law support for the government 
lawyer’s ability to disclose government wrongdoing, state supreme courts 
should amend their professional rules to clarify that government lawyers 
may disclose past government wrongdoing and to create an appropriate 
procedure for such disclosure. The rule should clarify that a government 
lawyer must first exhaust the internal process before disclosing the 
wrongdoing outside the government.  
An explicit exception would assist lawyers in clarifying their legal 
obligations. Setting out a specific and orderly procedure for these lawyers 
to follow is necessary because the government ought to be given the 
benefit of notice of forthcoming disclosure.  
 
 
 288. Id. at 94–100. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s rejection of Crandon’s 
wrongful discharge claim, but did not find that Crandon had violated the professional ethics rules. It 
found that Crandon acted with “reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the disclosure” when she 
reported the allegations to the FDIC before investigating the truth of her suspicions. Id. at 102–04. 
 289. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. 3 (2007). 
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B. Procedures for Disclosing Information that Must Be Released Under 
Freedom of Information Laws 
Darrell McGraw was the elected Attorney General of West Virginia 
and representing the Division of Environmental Protection (DEP) 
in litigation to enforce state landfill laws. During a meeting with the 
landfill owner, a representative of the DEP indicated that its 
position on landfill requirements might change. Attorney General 
McGraw later revealed this possible DEP change in position to a 
member of the public who was part of an environmental group. That 
revelation could have undermined the political ability of DEP to 
make the change, so DEP filed ethics charges against McGraw 
based on this unauthorized disclosure.290 McGraw argued that DEP 
had already revealed this information to the opposing party in a 
case and that this information would have had to be disclosed under 
the state FOIA. But the West Virginia Supreme Court ruled that the 
information was still subject to confidentiality under Rule 1.6 of 
West Virginia’s Rules of Professional Conduct and that the duty of 
confidentiality under that rule was not subject to waiver through 
disclosure to third parties as was the attorney-client privilege.291 
The court publicly reprimanded Attorney General McGraw for the 
unauthorized disclosure.292 
If one accepts the assertion that the government lawyer’s 
confidentiality obligation does not, as a substantive matter, cover 
information that must be disclosed under FOI laws, then it would seem 
that Darrell McGraw did not violate his duty of confidentiality. But this 
 
 
 290. Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. McGraw, 461 S.E.2d 850, 852–58 (W. Va. 1995).  
 291. See W.VA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6.  
 292. McGraw, 461 S.E.2d at 860–61, 862 n.25, 864 (noting that “FOIA sets forth specific 
procedures for requesting and obtaining public records”). See discussion of this case in Foster Cobbs 
Arnold, The “Public Record/Third Party Rule” of the Duty of Confidentiality: Situations in Which the 
Rule Arises and Attitudes Toward Its Application, 23 J. LEGAL PROF. 399, 405–06 (1999). 
 The inability of the West Virginia Attorney General to authorize his own disclosures may reflect 
the fact that the West Virginia Attorney General does not have the same kind of decision-making 
authority that the U.S. Justice Department has. The McGraw court explained that in West Virginia, 
there is “a traditional attorney-client relationship between the Attorney General and the state officer he 
represents.” McGraw, 461 S.E.2d at 862. The court also noted that “the role of the Attorney General is 
not to make public policy in his own right on behalf of the state[,] but rather to exercise his skill as the 
state’s chief lawyer to zealously advocate and defend the policy position of the officer or agency in the 
litigation . . . .” Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Manchin v. Browning, 296 S.E.2d 909, 920 
(W. Va. 1982)). Lawyers who by statute are given more decision-making authority may also have the 
ability to consent to disclosures on behalf of their clients. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss5/2
p 1033 Clark book pages.doc  5/20/2008 11:28:00 AM  
 
 
 
 
 
2007] GOVERNMENT LAWYERS AND CONFIDENTIALITY NORMS 1097 
 
 
 
 
Article asserts that there is also a procedural component to the duty of 
confidentiality in order to ensure that the lawyer is not making a biased 
judgment about application of the FOI laws. The Supreme Court has 
recognized a similar procedural component to a confidentiality duty 
imposed on government employees who have had access to classified 
information. In Snepp v. United States, the Court imposed a constructive 
trust on book royalties earned by a former CIA employee who published 
his book without first submitting it to the agency for prepublication 
review.293 Even though the book did not contain any confidential 
information,294 the Court nonetheless found that Snepp violated his 
fiduciary duty to safeguard confidential information by refusing to submit 
to the designated prepublication-review procedure.295 Similarly, 
government lawyers need to deal with both a substantive confidentiality 
standard as well as procedures for protecting confidential information.  
In order to implement this FOI exception in an orderly fashion, 
governments need to adopt a procedure for reviewing requests for 
disclosure. The federal government does not have such a procedure in 
place for government lawyers.296 But two federal agencies do have similar 
procedures in place: the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has a 
screening procedure for its employees who have had access to confidential 
investigations and the CIA has a prepublication-review procedure for 
employees with security clearances. The SEC regulation prohibits its 
employees from using “confidential or nonpublic information” when 
writing, lecturing, or teaching, and implements that prohibition by 
requiring employees to submit all publications and prepared speeches to 
the SEC General Counsel’s office for review.297 Similarly, the CIA 
 
 
 293. 444 U.S. 507, 510 (1980).  
 294. Id. at 509–10 (government stipulated that Snepp’s book did not reveal any classified 
information). 
 295. Id. at 508 (finding that his “promise [to submit the manuscript for prepublication review] was 
an integral part of Snepp’s concurrent undertaking ‘not to disclose any classified information’”). 
 296. But cf. Pillard, supra note 132, at 712 (noting that the Justice Department’s Office of Legal 
Counsel publishes the opinions it issues only after “seek[ing] permission from the requestors”). 
 297. 17 C.F.R. § 200.735-4(e)(1)–(2) (2007). See also 5 C.F.R. § 2635.703(a) (2007), which 
prohibits all executive branch employees from “the improper use [by any executive-branch employee] 
of nonpublic information to further his own private interest or that of another.” The regulation further 
states that nonpublic information includes information that is 
• routinely exempt from disclosure under the FOIA, 
• otherwise protected from disclosure by statute, Executive order or regulation, 
• is designated as confidential by an agency, or 
• has not actually been disseminated to the general public and is not authorized to be made 
available to the public on request. 
5 C.F.R. § 2635.703(b). 
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requires its employees to submit all writings related to the CIA to its 
Publications Review Board, which vets the documents to ensure that they 
do not contain any confidential national security information.298 While 
these review procedures are not without problems,299 they do provide an 
authoritative answer to the question of whether the government employee 
can disclose particular information.  
CONCLUSION 
It is not uncommon for current and former government lawyers to 
disclose information that appears to be covered by their professional 
obligation of confidentiality. In their memoirs, these lawyers generally do 
not acknowledge their professional confidentiality obligation.300 The 
actual practice of current and former government lawyers and the degree 
to which they acknowledge and comply with their professional duty of 
confidentiality are issues that deserve further attention.  
This Article has examined the content of the government lawyer’s 
professional duty of confidentiality, and in particular how that duty 
interacts with whistleblower protection and open government laws. It 
examined the complex question of the identity of a government lawyer’s 
client, noted that many government lawyers make decisions that are 
normally reserved for clients, and found that those lawyers can 
appropriately consider the public interest in making those decisions. 
The Article began with the story of Alberto Mora, who told a reporter 
about the internal Defense Department legal debates over the treatment of 
prisoners at Guantanamo. This information about the content of a lawyer’s 
advice to his client would be subject to the attorney-client privilege, and 
thus is not subject to mandatory disclosure under the Freedom of 
Information Act.301 But Mora was describing what he saw as misconduct 
on the part of other government officials. Under the analysis in this 
 
 
 298. See McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1983); United States v. Marchetti, 
466 F.2d 1309, 1318 (4th Cir. 1972) (upholding requirement that former CIA employees submit 
manuscripts for prepublication review for classified information). 
 299. See Adam Liptak, Agent in Leak Case Sues C.I.A. for Blocking the Release of Her Memoir, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2007, at A18; Dana Priest, Suing Over the CIA’s Red Pen: Retired Operative Says 
Agency Unfairly Edited His Book, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 2006, at A15. 
 300. See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW & JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION (2007). Goldsmith acknowledges his confidentiality duty based on national security 
classification, id. at 12, 219, but not his duty of confidentiality as a lawyer. While Goldsmith does not 
analyze his professional duty of confidentiality, he does point out that his memoir continues a long 
tradition of memoirs by former government lawyers. Id. at 221–23 (citing twenty-nine memoirs as 
well as law review articles, interviews, and testimony). 
 301. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2000). 
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Article, as a substantive matter, Mora would be able to disclose 
government misconduct. As a procedural matter, Mora attempted to 
address the problem within the government, going all the way up to the 
Defense Department’s General Counsel.302  
As a substantive matter, government lawyers may disclose government 
wrongdoing and may reveal information that is subject to disclosure under 
freedom of information laws. But as a procedural matter, state supreme 
courts and governments need to establish procedures for government 
lawyers to follow when disclosing wrongdoing or other information that 
would be subject to disclosure under freedom of information laws. 
 
 
 302. Mayer, supra note 1, at 35. 
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